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THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION OF THE AGON
BETWEEN LEGAL POWER AND
NARRATIVE MEANINGt
Steven L. Winter*
A judge decides for ten reasons/ nine of which nobody knows 1
The appearance of the wheels and their construction was as crystal, a
single likeness to the four of them, their appearance and construction as
if there were a wheel [thrust] inside a wheel. When they moved, they
2
could move to all four sides; they would not turn when they moved.
I.

AN INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE, AND A CAUTION

The relationship between narrative and law is ancient. Robert
Cover describes law as a concept rooted in "the sacred narratives of
our world."' 3 I will be reflecting on the role of narrative in law and, at
the same time, using the concept of narrative as a vehicle with which
t © 1989 Steven L. Winter.
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. B.A. 1974, Yeshiva College;
J.D. 1977, Columbia University. - Ed. Many of the best ideas in this essay were developed in
conversations and correspondence with George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Mark Turner, Jeremy
Paul, Jennifer Jaff,Peter Gabel, and Marc Fajer; each will recognize his or her invaluable contributions. I am also grateful to Lynn Winter, Terry Anderson, Steve Schnably, Michael Fischl,
David Caploe, Minnette Massey, Pat Gudridge, and Mark Tushnet for comments on the draft.
This article is dedicated to the teachers of my childhood, who told their stories and taught me to
experience empathy and to understand that justice is never to be assumed but always to be
pursued.
1. W.S. MERWIN, ASIAN FIGURES 65 (1973) (Chinese proverb).
2. Ezekiel 1:16-17. This is my own translation from the original Hebrew. In the Hebrew,
Ezekiel describes the appearance of the wheels as k'aiyn Tarshish - "like the eye of Tarsis."
This is a reference to a gem of disputed identity; the translation of this phrase as "crystal" is
given by the traditional commentary of Rashi (Rabbi Shlomo ben Yitzchak). I have retained the
conventional subjunctive rendering of the "wheel inside a wheel" clause despite the lack of the
subjunctive in Hebrew. To capture a sense closer to the original, I have interpolated the bracketed verb. According to Rashi and other traditional Jewish commentaries, the appearance was
of two wheels of equal size at perpendiculars - i.e., as if one had been inserted through the other
at right angles. This is how the creatures whom Ezekiel was describing could move in all four
directions without turning. Id., verse 17.
3. Cover, The Folktales ofJustice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REv.179, 180 (1985).
Amongst the many debts I owe to Cover's work is for the liberating effect it has had upon my
sense of my own past. For a long time, my traditional education in the extensive Jewish canon
was abandoned like a piece of old furniture in a musty attic. Cover's work has shown me how
the intellectual abundance of these materials can be a profound source of analytic insight. For
me, this has been a process of rediscovery - finding, refinishing, polishing, and encountering
anew a valuable antique. My use of traditional Jewish literature is, thus, neither pietistic nor
imitative. Rather, it is an unorthodox exposition of the deeply human insights of a rich and vital
tradition.
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to explore the issues of legitimacy and indeterminacy in law. I begin
my inquiry with a narrative, which I shall complete later in this essay
and return to subsequently. It is a favorite story from my childhood:
4
a midrash about Abraham as an eight-year-old child.
Terach, Abraham's father, was a maker of idols. Terach left his
shop one day, leaving his son in charge. When Terach returned, he
found all but one of the idols smashed. The remaining idol was the
largest of those in the shop. It stood with a stick tucked under one of
its arms. Terach confronted his son about the destruction. Abraham
explained that a woman had brought a bowl of flour as an offering to
the idols, that the idols quarrelled over the offering, and that the largest of the idols took a stick and destroyed the others. Terach reacted
with incredulity and anger: "Why do you make sport of me?" Abraham responded: "Should not your ears listen to what your mouth is
'5
saying?
Like Terach's idols, the constancy and certitude formerly associated with the traditional legal tools are today under attack from a variety of iconoclasts. Objectivist logic, analytic rigor, the "plain
meaning" of ordinary language, the capacity of precedent and legal
rules to determine outcomes; these no longer hold the power once accorded by convention. A new language game has arisen in defense of
the tradition: where once stood judicial opinions with their ratio
decidendi, statutes with their purposes and "legislative intent," there
are now only "texts" and "interpretive communities." ' 6 Ronald Dworkin compares the development of the law to the writing of a chain
novel by the authors of successive generations, determinate legal logic
now replaced by the principle of "integrity" and the assumed constraints of the story. 7 But these are only stopgaps, new idols holding
4. The Midrash is the collection of rabbinic parables that was part of the development of the
Oral Law starting in the fifth century B.C. and extending well into the third and fourth centuries
A.D. Epstein, Foreword to 1 D.H. FREEDMAN & M. SIMON, THE MIDRASH RABBAH x-xvii
(1977). For the midrashic derivation of Abraham's age, see id. at 311-12.
5. Id. at 310-11 (commenting on Genesis 11:28 - "And Haran died 'on the face of' his
father Terach, in the land of his birth, in Ur of the Chaldees."). See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 645 (1986); Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744-45 (1982). Fish and Fiss disagree to a significant
degree on how they understand "interpretation," see Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325
(1984), but they nevertheless share the premise identified in the text.
7. R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 228-38 (1986). Stanley Fish has argued that the analogy to
a chain novel does not accomplish the constraints that Dworkin supposes because any subsequent author will be as free as the first to reinterpret the plot, the characters, or the genre. Fish,
Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretationin Law and Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 551, 55256 (1982) [hereinafter Chain Gang]; Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 299, 304-08 (1983).
I discuss this question infra, text accompanying notes 111-17.
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the axe over the shattered pieces of their predecessors. 8
There is something surprising in the turn to narrative by modern
legal scholars. Indeed, when prestigious law reviews publish symposia
reflecting on the comparisons between law and literature9 and on the
relationships between law and narrative,10 one knows that something
unusual is afoot. Given the successive developments of refined doctrinalism, policy-oriented professionalism, and sophisticated attention
to philosophy that have characterized the American law school since

Langdell, some might see a turn to narrative as a step back, a turning
aside from "The Law." This turn to narrative might then be explained
as a reflection of the "extra-rational" power of narrative, as evocative
in the modern age as in more "primitive" times.'I
But I think that something much more significant is going on. As

the academic legal community comes increasingly to doubt its former
confidence in the neutrality and objectivity of standard legal analysis,

as it retreats from its faith in abstractions, it inevitably seeks solace in
the more concrete. I argue that there is something quite important in
8. "The pragmatist reminds us that a new and useful vocabulary is just that, not a sudden
unmediated vision of things or texts as they are." R. RORTY, Nineteenth-CenturyIdealism and
Twentieth-Century Textualism, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 153 (1982); see also id. at
155 ("textualism adds nothing save an extra metaphor to the romanticism of Hegel and the
pragmatism of James and Nietzsche").
For discussions exposing the authoritarian or elitist ethics concealed within the interpretive
turn, see Bakan, ConstitutionalArgument: Interpretationand Legitimacy in Canadian Constitutional Thought, 27 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 123, 173-76, 188-93 (1989); Brest, Interpretationand
Interest, 34 STAN, L. REV. 765 (1982). For a criticism of the "interpretive turn" for failing to
acknowledge the inevitable violence of the law, see Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J.
1601, 1601-02 (1986).
9. See InterpretationSymposium, 58 S.CAL. L. REV. 1 (1984); Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373 586 (1982); Hirshman, Bront, Bloom, and Bork- An Essay on the
MoralEducation ofJudges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177 (1988). But compare R. POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE (1988) with Fish, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and
Literature,97 YALE L.J. 773 (1988).
10. I refer to the current issue of the Michigan Law Review. See also Cover, The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). Cover's
concept of the relationship between narrative and law is discussed infra, at text accompanying
notes 104 & 155-58. I examine Cover's conception of law in greater depth in a recent article,
Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning,and the Cognitive Stakesfor Law, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989) [hereinafter TranscendentalNonsense].
11. For example, the biblical story of the exodus from Egypt has retained its power as a
narrative that speaks to the hopes and aspirations of an oppressed people. From Harriet Tubman
to Martin Luther King, Jr., the role of the black leader often has been expressed in terms of the
biblical story of Moses guiding the Children of Israel out of bondage. Thus, Harriet Tubman
who, in the period before the Civil War, helped fellow blacks escape slavery by means of the
Underground Railroad was also known as "Grandma Moses." In his final speech before his
death in Memphis, Dr. King made a direct allusion to Deuteronomy 34:1-4. "I have been to the
mountaintop.... [A]nd I have seen the promised land. I may not get there with you. But I
want you to know tonight, that we as a people will get to the promised land." Speech by Martin
Luther King, Jr., Mason Temple, Memphis, Tenn. (Apr. 3, 1968). Cf Luban, Difference Made
Legal: The Court and Dr.King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152 (1989) (analyzing King's Letterfrom a
Birmingham Jail).
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this solace-seeking, but that narrative will not save law from its crisis
of faith. Rather, the highest use and greatest facility of narrative is as
an iconoclastic tool of persuasion to legal and social change. 12 This
conclusion follows from the understanding that, although narrative
does play a role in the social construction of meaning, it is not the
primary means by which social meaning is institutionalized.
The attraction of narrative is that it corresponds more closely to
the manner in which the human mind makes sense of experience than
does the conventional, abstracted rhetoric of law. The basic thrust of
the cognitive process is to employ imagination to make meaning out of
the embodied experience of the human organism in the world. In its
prototypical sense as storytelling, narrative, too, proceeds from the
ground up. In narrative, we take experience and configure it in a conventional and comprehensible form. This is what gives narrative its
communicative power; it is what makes narrative a powerful tool of
persuasion and, therefore, a potential transformative device for the
disempowered.
On the other hand, narrative is not the primary medium for the
kind of institutionalized meaning that is necessary if a prevailing order
is to make persuasive its claims of legitimation and justification. Narrative does not meet the threefold demands of generality, unreflexivity,
and reliability that are necessary if a prevailing order is credibly to
justify itself. The more limited role of narrative in the processes of
social construction is as a link between experience and the effective
crystallization of social mores. (It is just this prefiguring role that
makes narrative a potentially effective transformative device.) But,
although narrative may also be employed on behalf of the existing order, this use of narrative as authority is persuasive precisely because it
evokes meaning that is already institutionalized. Accordingly, legal
narratives of this sort are constrained by preexisting social processes.
I pursue this argument in the following manner: In Part II, I first
provide a brief description of what we are learning about the grounded
and imaginative nature of the cognitive process. I then elaborate the
cognitive structure of the concept narrative and consider the manner
in which we employ that concept in recognizing, understanding, and
constructing narratives of all types - from folktales like the midrash
to avant-garde literature like Waiting for Godot.13 In Part III, I em12. This, of course, is the modus operandi of Derrick Bell's eloquent work. See, e.g., D.
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987). Feminists have long been aware of the importance
and power of the personal narrative; Catharine MacKinnon has called it feminism's "methodological secret." C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw 5

(1987).
13. Beckett, Waitingfor Godot, in SEVEN PLAYS OF THE MODERN THEATER (1962). Godot
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ploy this information about the cognitive and narrative processes to
explore the secondary role of narrative in the institutionalization of
legal and social meaning. I will identify the cognitive construct that
does act as the medium of institutionalized social meaning and discuss
its relation to, and constraint upon, legal narrative. This explanation
will involve a reconsideration and revisionist account of Karl Llewellyn's concept of "situation-sense." 1 4 In Part IV, I describe the cognitive dimension of the process by which narrative functions as a means

of persuasion and discuss its use by legal advocates. I close with a
brief discussion of how narrative can be a transformative device for the
disempowered and those seeking to change the legal and social status
quo.

Abraham's literal iconoclasm has always sparked my own. In previous work, I have rejected both the belief that meaning has foundations in objective correspondence with the world and the contrasting

view that meaning can be nothing more than the arbitrary result either
of social convention or of unconstrained subjectivity. Instead, I have

applied the insights of experientialist cognitive theory to describe
meaning as located in the process through which the human organism
interacts with its world and employs its experience imaginatively to

elaborate meaning through the use of experientially grounded imageschemata, models, metaphors, and metonymies. 1 5

I will be applying this approach throughout this essay. In contrast
has been called "the play that was to alter the course of theater in the 20th century." Gussow,
The Tramps Who Remade the Theater, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1988, § 2, at 1, col. 1. "After
'Godot' plots could be minimal; exposition, expendable; characters, contradictory; settings, unlocalized; and dialogue, unpredictable. Blatant farce could jostle tragedy." Id. at 20, col. 3 (quoting the critic Ruby Cohn).
14. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 60-61, 122-23
(1960). The ambiguity of Llewellyn's term is legend. See, eg., W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 216-23 (1973) (discussing and evaluating varying interpretations of Llewellyn's conception).
15. TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1130-36, 1142-56. It is important to understand that devices such as metaphor and metonymy are cognitive processes and not mere matters
of linguistics or rhetoric. Conventional views of metaphor fail entirely to capture its systematicity and centrality in the construction of human conceptual schemes - aspects of metaphor that
can be demonstrated empirically. See, e.g., M. JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); G. LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND
DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); G. LAKOFF &
M. JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980); G. LAKOFF & M. TURNER, MORE THAN COOL
REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR (1989); E. SWEETSER, FROM ETYMOLOGY
TO PRAGMATICS: THE MIND-AS-BODY METAPHOR IN SEMANTIC STRUCTURE AND SEMANTIC

CHANGE (forthcoming); see also ON METAPHOR (S. Sacks ed. 1979) (particularly the papers of
Paul Ricoeur, Max Black, and Nelson Goodman).
In general, conventional theories of semantics are imprisoned by the either/or nature of the
subject/object dichotomy. According to the conventional analyses, there is the human subject,
the external object, and language which either does or does not connect them: either language
maps onto the objective world in a 1:1 correspondence or it does not, in which case it is all
arbitrary and socially contingent. I am challenging these assumptions and arguing instead that
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to the objectivist view, I offer a perspective that implicitly rejects the
determinacy of analytic logic and affirms the purely constructed quality of narrative understanding. In contrast to the subjectivist view, I
question the perspective that narrative is only instrumental and, therefore, at base a purely political tool. I suggest instead that the power

and meaning of narrative is simultaneously epistemic and political.
This sense of the mutual entailment of the epistemic and the political
will yield a threefold set of questions: How is cognitive structure a

constraint on meaning? In what sense is power prior to the story? In
what way can storytelling be a meaningful constraint on power?
II.

COGNITIVE STRUCTURE AND NARRATIVE MEANING

A.

Cognition as Imaginative Configuration

To be human is to seek coherence, constantly to engage in an "effort after meaning." 16 An important part of that process is the super17
imposition of narrative structure on the raw data of life's events.
The connection between narrative and understanding is reflected in its

etymology. The word "narrative" derives not only from the Latin
narrdre which means "to tell," but also from the Latin gndrus which
18

means "having knowledge or experience."'
It would be a mistake, however, to see narrative as the only or even
the primary device by which the mind makes meaning out of the
world in flux around it. 19 To understand and appreciate narrative, it is
first necessary to understand the cognitive process that gives rise to the
any sensible approach to language must recognize that it does not come from the world "out
there" nor does it come "out of nowhere." See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
Instead, I have described a multidimensional approach to human rationality which recognizes: (1)that we cannot describe the world in any way that is "objective" in the sense of being
outside of a particular, human conceptual scheme; (2) that we exist, nevertheless, within a real
world which imposes reality constraints on what those conceptual systems can look like; (3) that
those constraints are not just "external," but a function of the process by which human rationality is grounded in the imaginative, embodied interaction of the human organism with its environment; (4) that the imaginative dimension of the cognitive process accounts for the relativity of
the different cultural elaborations of the world; and (5) that the grounded, embodied nature of
human rationality is what makes intersubjective meaning possible.
16. Bruner, Foreword to D. SPENCE, THE FREUDIAN METAPHOR: TOWARD PARADIGM
CHANGE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS at xii (1987) (attributing phrase to Sir Frederic Bartlett); see also
N. HOLLAND, 5 READERS READING 13-14 (1975).
17. See Cover, supra note 10, at 5 ("narratives... are the trajectories plotted upon material
reality by our imaginations").
18. OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 768, 1155 (P. Glare ed. 1985). Both of these Latin words
come from the Indo-European gnd ("to know"), which is the root of both the Greek gigndskein
and the Latin cognoscere; these in turn yield the English words "know," "cognition," and
"noun," amongst others. Turner, Social Dramas and Stories About Them, in ON NARRATIVE
163 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1980).
19. See generally P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY
(1966); N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING (1978).
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narrative urge. There is a definite relation between narrdre as "telling" and gndrus as "having experience." It lies in the way the human
mind constructs meaning "from the ground up," bootstrapping from
its own basic experience in the world and imaginatively elaborating
in its further interactions with its
those thought structures or schemata
20
physical and social environment.
The human mind employs basic, embodied experiences to construct more elaborate and abstract social meanings. As embodied organisms, we achieve upright posture and balance in the world. We
experience our bodies as structured wholes with identifiable parts. We
individuate objects outside ourselves. Our visual field appears to have
a foreground or center in which objects are in sharpest focus and a

periphery, both at the horizon and at the sides, in which things are
relatively less clear. We propel ourselves through space to obtain de-

sired objects. Sometimes, our way is blocked by an obstacle and we
must exert additional force in order to overcome or avoid it. Some
objects are so configured as to contain other objects. Some objects are
connected to other objects, even as we link ourselves to others by
handholding and other physical means.
Each of these quite basic interactions with the world is generalizable, and each is in fact generalized across a series of other domains.

Each of these generalizations is a mental construct by which the
human mind creates meaning, a "recurring structure" or "repeatable
pattern" that is "a chief means for achieving order in our experience

so that we can comprehend and reason about

'

it."21

These basic image-

20. The idea of "cognitive bootstrapping" that I invoke above is related to L6vi-Strauss's
notion of bricolage, which he uses to describe the difference between "mythical thought" and
modern, "scientific thought." C. LivI-STRAUsS, THE SAVAGE MIND 16-22 (1966). As L6viStrauss explains:
The characteristic feature of mythical thought is that it expresses itself by means of a heterogeneous repertoire which, even if extensive, is nevertheless limited. It has to use this repertoire, however, whatever the task at hand because it has nothing else at its disposal....
... "[The elements are collected or retained on the principle that "they may always come
in handy." Such elements are specialized up to a point.., but not enough for each of them
to have only one definite and determinate use. They each represent a set of actual and
possible relations; they are "operators" but they can be used for any operations of the same
type.
Id. at 17-18. The difference between the theory described in the text and the concept of bricolage
invoked by L6vi-Strauss is twofold. First, Lvi-Strauss was describing and distinguishing mythical or "primitive" thought, on the one hand, from either artistic or scientific thought, on the
other. In contrast, experientialist cognitive theory demonstrates that the same processes characterize all human cognition, irrespective of current ideological pretensions either to "scientific
rationalism" or to "artistic creativity." Second, Lvi-Strauss assumes that the elements used by
the bricoleur are collected haphazardly or at random. Experientialism posits that the most basic
of these elements are embodied and that additional elements and constructs are acquired through
experience in relatively systematic and predictable ways.
21. M. JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 28; cf I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON A 141, B
180 (N. Smith trans. 1933) ("No image could ever be adequate to the concept of a triangle in
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schemata - like up-down, balance, part-whole, object, center-periphery, source-path-goal,force-barrier,container, and link - are indispensable to human rationality. 22 They provide structure to human
thought, although they are neither objective nor determinate aspects
of the world itself.23 These schemata are, nevertheless, powerful aspects of human rationality because their operation is automatic and.
unreflexive - that is, without conscious awareness, reflection, or
control.
The unreflexive use of these schemata to structure our understandings of more complex, abstract domains is everywhere apparent. For
example, the use of the balance schema to structure legal reasoning as
a process of "weighing" the evidence, "weighing" competing interests,
applying multi-part "balancing" tests, and the like all attest to the centrality of our direct embodied experiences to the elaboration and understanding of our abstract intellectual endeavors. Similarly, the
source-path-goal schema is the basic structure by means of which we
elaborate many diverse concepts metaphorically, as in:
LIFE IS A JOURNEY One "makes one's way" in life; a successful
person is one who "goes far in life";24 a person may be unsuccessful because he or she has no "direction."
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, IMPEDIMENTS TO PURPOSES ARE OBSTACLES TO MOTION What's the "point" of your project? How "far

along" is it? The project is growing by "leaps and bounds"; the project

' '2 5
has hit a "snag"; it is at an "impasse.

ADJUDICATION IS MOVEMENT ALONG A PATH - Litigation is a judicial "proceeding"; the plaintiff must "carry the burden" of proof, a presumption may "shift" the burden of "going forward"; the parties cite
supporting "grounds" for their "motions";
alternatively, parties may de26
cide to "forgo" their procedural rights.
These image-schemata and the metaphors they motivate are by no
means the only intellectual tools by which we organize our rationality.
general. It would never attain that universality of the concept which renders it valid of all triangles ....The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere but in thought. It is a rule of synthesis of
the imagination ....").
22. See TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1146-48; Winter, The MetaphorofStanding and the Problem ofSelf-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1384-85, 1493 (1988) [hereinafter Standing]. The balance schema and the force schema each consist of several kindred
schemata with related experiential groundings. See M. JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 42-48, 85-89.
23. TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1133-34.
24. For other examples, see id. at 1132-33; G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 4144; G. LAKOFF & M. TURNER, supra note 15, at 4-7, 9-10.
25. See TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1132-33; Standing,supra note 22, at 1385;
G. LAKOFF & M. TURNER, supra note 15, at 4.
26. See Standing, supra note 22, at 1388-91; TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at
1216-19. Because adjudication is a form of purposive activity, this metaphoric conceptualization
is actually a special case of the PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS metaphor.

August 1989]

The Cognitive Dimension

2233

Central to the intellectual process is the construction and sharing

within a culture of idealized cognitive models ("ICMs") to structure
and make meaningful regular aspects of our daily experience. 27 These
are like "stock stories" or "folk theories" by which humans in a given
culture organize the diverse inputs of daily life into meaningful gestalts
that relate that which is "relevant" and ignore that which is not.
Suppose, for example, we enter a restaurant, seat ourselves, and are
then confronted by a human with pad and pencil. Does this stranger
want to hear our life stories? Challenge our right to enter the premises? Take our bet on the afternoon race? Any of these are possible
and, on particular occasions, may in fact be the case. Yet, we "know"
automatically that the person is asking for our order because we have
unreflexively assumed a "restaurant scenario" which organizes our understanding of the events around us. 28 Although it may vary somewhat from country to country or even region to region, neither the

structure nor content of this "restaurant scenario" is arbitrary within
a given culture. Thus, although the scenario is socially contingent, it
27. The term "idealized cognitive model" ("ICM") is a term of art in cognitive theory. The
concept is described in greater detail in TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1152-53.
Richard Delgado provides a particularly thoughtful example of the way in which we commonly reason in terms of idealized cognitive models in his second counter-story "The Anonymous Leaflet." He describes the role that an idealized "model," "mythic figure," or "paragon"
plays in faculty hiring decisions. Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionistsand Others: A Pleafor
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989). His account corresponds precisely to the kind of
reasoning in terms of ICMs detailed by cognitive theory. See, eg., G. LAKOFF, supra note 15, at
87-88, 90 & 145.
The concept of an idealized cognitive model is closely related to the idea of a "stock story"
used by Gerry L6pez in his excellent article on the role of ordinary cognitive processes in law.
L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984). Lay Lawyering draws on much of the same
social science work as experientialism. Compare id. at 5 nn.2-4, 16 n.30, 17 nn.36-38 (referring
to the work of Roger Schank & Robert Abelson, Eleanor Rosch, Amos Tversky, George Lakoff,
and Mark Johnson) with G. LAKOFF, supra note 15, at 39-57, 68, 78, 89-90, 271-73 (same). Jay
Feinman's recent article on legal classification also draws on the work of Eleanor Rosch; he
elaborates a concept he calls a "paradigm" that is substantially close to the ICM. Feinman, The
Jurisprudenceof Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 699-700 (1989). The chief difference is
that L6pez and Feinman draw upon the state of the art as of approximately 1980, whereas the
approach developed in G. LAKOFF, supra note 15, and applied in my work is premised on further
empirical and theoretical work within those disciplines since that time.
28. See R. SCHANK & R. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS, AND UNDERSTANDING: AN
INQUIRY INTO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES 42-46 (1977); Rumelhart & Ortony, The
Representation of Knowledge in Memory, in SCHOOLING AND THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE 99 (R. Anderson, R. Spiro & W. Montague eds. 1977). Schank and Abelson provide an

excellent example of how we use the restaurant scenario unreflexively in reading and understanding even a simple literary passage:
Consider, for example, the sentence:
While giving his order to the waiter at Mamma Leone's one evening, Spillane was approached by the owner, a notorious Mafia figure.
The "while"-clause functions to set the Leone's restaurant context with its huge store of
generalized and specific world knowledge. Nevertheless, the reader does not slow down to
work out who "the waiter" is or how Spillane came to be talking to him, but quickly notes
that Spillane is probably at a table, in the act of ordering, in a well-known Italian restaurant.
R. SCHANK & R. ABELSON, supra, at 37-38.
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nevertheless provides sufficient constraints to ground intersubjective

meaning because it is grounded in the particular social experiences of
members of that culture.

Not all ICMs consist of scenarios or scripts. Some consist of a
related group of propositions grounded in a physical or cultural experience, as in the ICM of mother.29 Some are organized by means of

image-schemata, as in my description of a cause of action as an 1CM
structured by means of the source-path-goal schema. 30 Others are
structured in terms of metaphors, as in my description of the ICM of
the first amendment as structured in terms of a fluid metaphor (the
31
"free flow" of ideas) and the modem marketplace of ideas metaphor.

Still other ICMs involve metonymies, as is the case with familiar social
stereotypes. 32 But all ICMs share several features in common. Like
the image-schemata: (1) ICMs are grounded in or draw upon direct
physical or cultural knowledge; (2) they are highly generalized in order to capture and relate together a broad range of particularized fact

situations; (3) they are unconscious structures of thought that are invoked automatically and unreflexively to make sense of new information; and (4) they are not determinate, objective characterizations of
reality, but rather idealized structures that effectively characterize
some but not all of the varied situations that humans confront in their
daily interactions with their physical and social environment.

The role and importance of idealized cognitive models in human
thought can be illustrated by reconsidering the first part of the mid-

rash about Abraham and the idols with which I opened this essay.
This story is only comprehensible because the reader automatically
invokes several ICMs to make sense of the events. First, the reader
29. This model is grounded in the social experiences of the nuclear family in a patriarchal
culture. It assumes natural childbirth by a married woman who is the primary nurturer and fulltime caretaker. Variants from this model are not prototypical mothers, but rather stepmothers,
surrogatemothers, biological mothers,foster mothers, working mothers, or unwed mothers. Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10,
13-14 (1987) (discussing G. LAKOFF, supra note 15, at 80-81); Standing, supra note 22, at 138586 (discussing G. LAKOFF, supra note 15, at 74, 79-84).
30. See Standing, supra note 22, at 1388-90; cf supra note 26 and accompanying text.
31. See Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 10, at 1185-92. The fluid metaphor derives
from the structural metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS WATER. It yields the rule against prior restraints:
The experience of unhealthy, stagnant waters structures the conception of the evil to be avoided
as the halting of intellectual progress toward "truth." The market metaphor comes, of course,
from Holmes's dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). It yields
the focus on autonomy and on the public forum that characterizes much of modem first amendment doctrine.
32. See G. LAKOFF, supra note 15, at 84-88. What occurs in the case of stereotypes is that
attributes which are experienced with respect to some members of a social group are ascribed to
all. Stereotypes are metonymies because the experientially grounded part (the attributes of some)
comes to stand for the whole (the entire social group).
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automatically combines an ICM of a commercial activity (in which it
is understood that it is necessary to have someone to mind the store)
with an ICM of filial relations (in which it would be appropriate for a
father to ask a son to do so and appropriate for the father to hold the
son accountable). Second, the reader makes sense of the moral of the
story by invoking and contrasting two opposing ICMs of idol worship.
In one ICM, it is understood that idols are thought to have powers
and that idol worshipers make offerings to them. In the other, it is
understood that idols are totemic human constructions without any
actual powers.
The significance of the concept of idealized cognitive models is that
it explains the economy of our ordinary thought processes. It took
slightly more space to explain the peripheral but indispensable information supplied by these ICMs than to recount the original story.
Each ICM is like a crystalline information structure evoked by metonymic terms such as "father," "son," "shop," "idol," and "offering."
These individual scripts or "stock stories" are essential subparts unreflexively invoked to make sense of the story. The reader brings these
scripts to the story, ready to engage in a joint process of "construction
as if there were a wheel [thrust] inside a wheel."
Even the ICMs described above do not exhaust the cognitive
processes by which the reader makes meaning out of the midrash.
How is it that this artifact of an ancient culture is easily recognizable
as a story? How is it that, even without knowing that the purpose of
the midrash is to teach a religious lesson, one knows to abstract a
moral?3 3 How is it that the reader knows he or she is expected to side
with Abraham and not with Terach as the property owner or with the
woman as the victim of the social processes of idolatry? The answer,
of course, is that we have an ICM for the concept story; this ICM
serves as "a cognitive template against which new inputs can be
matched and in terms of which they can be comprehended." ' 34 The
internal structure of the ICM is what yields these insights: first, that
the story has a moral and, second, that the moral intended by the
author can only be obtained by taking Abraham's point of view.
For an account to be perceived as a coherent narrative or story, it
"enumeration of events in
must be more than a "simple succession" or
serial order"; it must be "a configuration. ' 35 This configuration has a
33. Cf Cover, supra note 10, at 5 ("every narrative is insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, its moral").
34. Rumelhart & Ortony, supra note 28, at 131.
35. 1 P. RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE 65 (1984). I put aside for the moment the philosophical question whether this sequential wholeness is logical or temporal. See id. at 38-40.
Ricoeur's approach is to accept as a "transcultural form of necessity" the circularity of the de-
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part-whole structure of a particular type: In Aristotle's famous dictum
describing the prerequisites of a proper, complete story, "a thing is a
whole if it has a beginning, a middle, and an end."' 36 A story is conceptualized as movement along a path,37 the sequence of its events
configured by means of the source-path-goalschema. 38 As such, we do

not think it much of a "story" if the account "goes nowhere," if it has
no "point."'39 The role of the source-path-goal schema in elaborating
the concept of story structure is related to the PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS metaphor. The reader understands the narrator to be asking
pendence between narrativity and our constructed sense of time. Id at 52-54. Drawing on
Heidegger, Ricoeur maintains that both narrativity and the narrative structure of temporality
"share the same foundations in within-time-ness." Id. at 64. The account I give employs a
similar strategy of seeking escape from circularity in a shared grounding. In this cognitive account, however, both the "logic" of the story and its time-structure are similarly grounded in
non-narrative, embodied experience. See infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
36. ARISTOTLE, POETIcS 50b.
37. For those who are as devoted to Strunk & White as I am, it will come as little surprise to
find such advice as the following:
[W]ork from a suitable design.... [T]he writer will need at least a rough scheme; he cannot
plunge in blindly and start ticking off fact after fact ... lest he miss the forest for the trees
and there be no end to his labors....
•.. [E]ven the kind of writing that is essentially adventurous and impetuous will on
examination be found to have a secret plan: Columbus didn'tjustsail, he sailed west, and the
new world took shape from this simple, and we now think sensible, design.
Many shortcuts are self-defeating; they waste the reader's time instead of conserving
it.... The longest way round is usually the shortest way home, and the one truly reliable
shortcut in writing is to choose words that are strong and sure-footed to carry the reader on
his way.
W. STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 70-71, 81 (3d ed. 1979) (emphasis
added). The source-path-goalschema appears as well in such philosophically sophisticated work
as that of Paul Ricoeur:
To follow a story is to move forward in the midst of contingencies and peripeteia under
the guidance of an expectation that finds its fulfillment in the "conclusion" of the story.
This conclusion ... gives the story an "end point". . . . To understand the story is to
understand how and why the successive episodes led to this conclusion ....
I P. RICOEUR, supra note 35, at 66-67 (emphasis added). See also V. PROPP, MORPHOLOGY OF
THE FOLKTALE 92 (2d ed. 1968) ("Morphologically, a tale... may be termed any development
proceedingfrom villainy.., or a lack... through intermediary functions to marriage ... or to
other .... [tjerminal functions .... ") (emphasis added); Cover, supra note 10, at 5 ("narratives
... are the trajectoriesplotted upon material reality by our imaginations") (emphasis added).
38. Similarly, Lakoff describes the structure of a scenario in terms of these same two
schemata:
[T]he scenario is structured by means of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema in the time domain, where
- the initial state = the source
- the final state = the destination
- the events = locations on the path and the path stretches through time. The scenario
is a WHOLE and each of these elements is a PART.
G. LAKOFF, supra note 15, at 285-86.
39. The Western Apache have a tradition of historical narrative that consists of stories that
encode moral lessons of appropriate communal behavior. Ifa member of the tribe violates such a
norm, the story will be told to remind that person how to behave. Typically, the teller is an elder
who may tell the story to a larger group without specifying the intended "target." Each story is
named after and situated in a place in the local landscape, so that the local geography acts as a
metonym for the moral lesson. As described by one Apache:
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him or her to follow the story to its end; the reader, therefore, expects
the story to have a point. Because the act of narration is understood
as a communicative act, the reader expects that the narrator intends
that point as the moral. 40
The use of the source-path-goal schema has several other entailments that are central to our understanding of a story as a structured
whole. First, the concept of movement along a path towards a goal
obviously entails a moving entity, usually a person. This traveller is
the protagonist of the story; it is whom the story is about and whom
the reader keeps track of. Second, consistent with the conceptualiza-

tion

LIFE IS A JOURNEY,

we expect the protagonist to face certain ob-

stacles that must be overcome, usually by force. This provides an agon
- a struggle, contest, or dramatic conflict - as the focus of the narrative.41 As illustrated in Figure 1, this sketch gives us the most basic
story structure: a simple travel scenario.
It is a commonplace in literature that actual journeys provide central thematic structure - as in the biblical story of Jacob's struggle
with the angel, 42 Homer's Odyssey, 43 virtually the entire canon of RusSo someone stalks you and tells a story about what happened long ago. It doesn't matter
if other people are around - you're going to know he's aiming that story at you. All of a
sudden it hits you! It's like an arrow, they say....
It's hard to keep on living right. Many things jump up at you and block your way. But
mhat
you won't forget that story. You're going to see the place where it happened ....
place will keep on stalking you like the one who shot you with the story.
Basso, "Stalking with Stories" Names, Places, andMoral Narrativesamong the Western Apache,
in TEXT, PLAY, AND STORY: THE CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF SELF AND SOCIETY 42 (E. Bruner ed. 1984). Note that the Native American narrator of this passage employs
the source-path-goalschema, the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, and a hunting metaphor which is
motivated by the structural metaphor RATIONAL ARGUMENT IS WAR. On the latter, see G.
LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 61-65; Standing, supra note 22, at 1410-11.
Milner Ball cites another Native American usage of the LIFE ISA JOURNEY metaphor. In the
"Two Row Wampum," the two rows "symbolize two paths or two vessels travelling down the
same river together." Ball, Stories of Origin and ConstitutionalPossibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2280, 2314 (1989).
40. See Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 41 (P.

Cole & J. Morgan eds. 1975).
41. The centrality of conflict to the practice of storytelling begins with early childhood. At
this stage, however, children's stories have very little recognizable structure; they tend to be
about conflicts and crises that are beyond their control. See Sutton-Smith, The OriginsofFiction
and the Fictions of Origin, in TEXT, PLAY, AND STORY, supra note 39, at 117, 117-23. My
account of narrative structure should not, therefore, be understood as an assertion that there is
anything universally true or objectively predetermined about the nature of the ICM that I am
attempting to reconstruct. Rather, the developed nature of the ICM attests to its cultural construction and social reinforcement. See id. at 123 ("the structure and character of that narrative
form is not automatically derivable from some universal childhood experience"). At the same
time, the centrality of conflict to even the most embryonic narratives of early childhood corroborates that the cognitive process is a product of the effort to master and make sense of the
complexity and adversity of experience.
42. Genesis 32:22-32. For contrasting structuralist and deconstructionist readings of this
story, see R. BARTHES, The Struggle with the Angel, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 125 (1977).
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FIGURE 1
Simple Travel Scenario
traveller

SOURCE

> / obstacle \

PATH

> destination

>

GOAL

sian folktales,4 and even a modem work like Kerouac's On the
Road.4 5 In these larger narratives, the part-whole structure is experientially grounded in our knowledge of journeys. This provides a natural starting and ending point in the protagonist's home and a natural
beginning and ending for the time dimension of the story. 46 Typically,
the obstacle entailment of the travel scenario is filled out in the story
domain as an agon that is an encounter and conflict with an antagonist. Figure 2 provides an illustration of this extended travel scenario.

Not all stories fit so neat and so ready-made a structure as that
provided by a journey. Nevertheless, the source-path-goalschema remains central to the ways in which stories are constructed. The third
entailment of the schema is that it provides the story's internal conception of time. 47 This is consistent with our conventional understanding
of time, which is structured in terms of two source-path-goal metaphors.48 Thus, the time structure of a narrative is not dependent upon
any correspondence to the "real world," nor constructed in terms of
narrative itself, but grounded in our metaphoric conception of time by
means of the source-path-goal schema.
43. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY (A. Pope trans. 1942).
44. See V. PROPP, supra note 37, at 36-39.
45. J. KEROUAC, ON THE ROAD (1955).
46. Even Kerouac's On the Road, a novel of ultimate rootlessness, begins and ends in New
York. Id. at 5, 252-53. Although the Odyssey doesn't actually begin at home, that earlier, untold
portion of the story is inferred by the reader. This is a standard mode of variation from prototypical story-structure. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
47. See G. LAKOFF, supra note 15, at 285-86 (quoted supranote 38). Stories have an internal
time structure, or "story-time," that can be different from the temporal order of the storytelling
itself, the "discourse-time." Chatman, What Novels Can Do that Films Can't (and Vice Versa), in
ON NARRATIVE, supra note 18, at 118.
48. Both of these metaphors conceptualize time in terms of motion. In one, time moves
toward us; in the other, time is stationary and we move toward and through it. We use these
metaphors separately and together. When used separately, we get expressions like: the hours
"fly by"; the time "will come"; the days "ahead"; the weeks "past." When used together, we
have such otherwise contradictory statements as: "I'm looking 'forward' to midsemester break,
which will be all next week and the week 'following.'" G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note
15, at 41-44.
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FIGURE 2
Extended Travel Scenario/Basic Travel Story
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In many cases, the elaboration of intelligible beginnings and endings is structured by means of a balance schema. As illustrated in

Figure 3, a scenario of this type begins with the description of a status
quo by the narrator, an initial state in which life is in harmonious

balance. Something disturbs that balance - a need, a lack, a deprivation, or a transformation. The protagonist seeks to restore the bal-

ance; there is a conflict and a resolution. The original balanced state is
restored or some new balance attained.
final state

initial state
protagonist

\

> transformation or lack

A

> restoration

[balance schema]

SOURCE

PATH

>

GOAL

FIGURE 3
Basic TransformationScenario
The scenarios I have described so far are embryonic narratives, the
most elementary story structures. We are now ready to assemble these
scenarios into an idealized cognitive model sufficiently rich meaningfully to account for the concept of narrative. Narrative is understood
by means of an ICM structured in terms of four schemata: the partwhole, the source-path-goal the balance, and the force-barrier schemata. These schemata serve as a kind of genetic material or template
for a wide variety of different stories in which the plot structure follows a protagonist through an agon to a resolution. As illustrated in

2240

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:2225

Figure 4, the simple traveller becomes the more generalizable protagonist. The antagonist is, typically, the agent that causes the imbalance.
The protagonist meets the antagonist, and a struggle ensues. This provides an agon as the pivotal point of the narrative. Its resolution also
49
restores the initial state of balance and provides a sense of closure.
The story structure itself allows the reader clearly to infer the motivation of the protagonist.
initial state
protagonist

final state
-

> antagonist -

> agon = resolution/restoration/reward

transformation or lack

A

[motivation]
[balance schema]

SOURCE

PATH

>

GOAL

FIGURE 4
1CM of Basic Story Structure
More elaborate stories can be constructed by means of recursive
structures in which the protagonist may go through a series of agones
until a final resolution or new balance is achieved. These recursive
structures take at least two different forms. They can function as
modifying subplots that, much as with a relative clause in a sentence,
provide information necessary to the progress of the main story. To
use an example from Vladimir Propp's extensive study of Russian
folktales, the protagonist is often in need of a magic agent like a magic
sword or a steed with which to defeat the primary antagonist and redress the initial disequilibrium. The magic agent is usually obtained as
a result of a fight or verbal encounter (often involving a strategic deceit
by the protagonist) with a character whom Propp designates a "donor."' 50 This donor scenario is, thus, an agon within the agon that is
49. Again, a nonprototypical novel like On the Road provides a useful illustration. The book
opens with the line: "I first met Dean not long after my wife and I split up." J. KEROUAC, supra
note 45, at 5. At the close of the book, the narrator meets quite by accident "the girl with the
pure and innocent dear eyes that I had always searched for and for so long." Id. at 250-51.
Within two pages, he bids Dean Moriarty good-bye. Id. at 253.
50. V. PROPP,supra note 37, at 39-50. Many Native American folktales display exactly the
same structural subparts catalogued by Propp. See, e.g., C. LAVI-STRAUSS, Structuralism and
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the larger story.
Alternatively, the recursive structures can operate sequentially,
much as a series of conjunctive clauses in a sentence. Both this storystructure and the operation of the general ICM of narrative can be
illustrated by completing and analyzing the midrash about Abraham
and the idols with which I started this essay. Abraham, it will be
remembered, took a stick and smashed all but one of his father's idols.
He placed the stick in the hand of the remaining idol and blamed the
destruction on that survivor. His father reacted angrily, recognizing
the impossibility of his son's story. Abraham responded by pointing
out the hypocrisy of his father's position.
"Thereupon," the midrash continues, Terach "seized him and delivered him to Nimrod." Both Terach and Abraham's brother, Haran,
were present. King Nimrod challenged Abraham's impudence, and
the following argument ensued:
'Let us worship the fire!' he [Nimrod] proposed. 'Let us rather worship
water, which extinguishes the fire,' replied he. 'Then let us worship
water!' 'Let us rather worship the clouds which bear the water.' 'Then
let us worship the clouds!' 'Let us rather worship the winds which disperse the clouds.' 'Then let us worship the wind!' 'Let us rather worship
human beings, who withstand the wind.' 'You are just bandying words,'
he exclaimed; 'we will worship nought but the fire. Behold, I will cast
you into it, and let your God whom you adore come and save you from
it.' Now Haran was standing there undecided. If Abram is victorious,
[thought he], I will say that I am of Abram's belief, while if Nimrod is
victorious, I will say that I am on Nimrod's side. When Abram descended into the fiery furnace and was saved, he [Nimrod] asked him,
'Of whose belief are you?' 'Of Abram's,' he replied. Thereupon he
seized him and cast him into the fire; his in[n]ards were scorched and he
died in his father's presence. Hence it is written, AND HARAN DIED IN
THE PRESENCE OF ('AL PENE) HIS FATHER TERACH.

5I

This story is structured as a recursive series of agones in which
Ecology, in A VIEW FROM AFAR 101, 105-08 (1985) (describing variations of a common mythological story amongst tribes in British Columbia).
The overall account of story structure given in the text is very much influenced by Propp and
his structuralist successors, particularly Roland Barthes. See Introduction to the StructuralAnalysis of Narratives, in R. BARTHES, supra note 42, at 79. Although Propp did not identify the
basic units in quite the way I have, he recognized the recursive structure of many folkstories. V.
PROPP, supra note 37, at 92 ("Each new act of villainy, each new lack creates a move. One tale
").My formulation owes a great deal to conversations with George
may have several moves ....
Lakoff and Mark Turner.
51. 1 D.H. FREEDMAN & M. SIMON, supra note 4, at 311 (quoting Genesis 11:28). The
rabbis of the midrash interpreted 'alpene as if the verse read 'alyideh. The latter phrase translates literally as "on the hands of" or, more properly, "by the hands of" or "by means of." The
intimation is that Terach's trade in idols led to Haran's death. Id. at 311 n.2.
In the traditional Jewish account, Abraham's father left Ur of the Chaldees to go toward
Canaan because of this incident. Commentary of Rashi on Genesis 11:31. On the name change
from Abram to Abraham, see Genesis 17:5.
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Abraham bests successively more powerful antagonists until he has
achieved his primary goal. First, Abraham engages in uneven combat
with the helpless idols. Then, he bests his father in argument. This
agon is, of course, verbal; but the practice of verbal argument is itself
understood in terms of combat through the structural metaphor RATIONAL ARGUMENT IS WAR. 5 2 Abraham wins this agon with his father, who then delivers him to the King. Abraham uses his verbal and
logical facility to best Nimrod too. So Nimrod subjects Abraham to
the test of fire, which he survives as well. From his first encounter
with the inert figures, through that with his father, the King, and finally the elements, Abraham remains victorious.
The denouement, however, concerns the death of Abraham's
brother. If one assumes only the lesson of faith that the rabbis of the
midrash no doubt intended, the death of Haran can be understood to
underscore the seriousness of the moral of the story: Faith in God is
not a simple question of belief; it is a matter of life or death. In this
view, Haran's death and its attendant lesson become the logical stopping place of the story only because that is the way in which the narrators chose to frame it.
There is, no doubt, some truth to this view. But it misses the role
of the balance schema in the construction of this meaning. Moreover,
it misses the way in which the unreflexive understanding that a story
has balance supports alternative meanings as well. Let me demonstrate the role of the balance schema in structuring both the traditional and a revisionist reading of this midrash.
The traditional reading has power because the midrash starts with
a picture of the emptiness of idol worship: Abraham assails his father
for the vacuousness of his trade in and worship of idols when he lacks
any belief in their power. When Haran proclaims his belief in Abraham's faith, we know that this too is hollow. For his false faith, Haran
suffers a very specific punishment: "his in[n]ards [a]re scorched" and
he becomes as hollow as his opportunistic protestations of belief. This
symmetry is reflected in the statement that "Haran died 'alpene" literally, "on the face of" - "his father Terach." The Hebrew word
for "face" (panim) is a variant of the word that means "insides"
(penim). In this reading, Haran dies because of Terach's inner
hollowness.
The midrash, however, contains another balanceconfiguration that
suggests another meaning. At the start, Abraham exploits the absence
of his father physically to destroy his father's handiwork. When con52. G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supranote 15, at 61-65; Standing,supra note 22, at 1410-11.
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fronted about this act, Abraham uses his intellectual prowess to mock
the authority of his father. He is then taken before a King whose very
name means "rebelled against": The word nimrod is formed from the
passive of the Hebrew verb mered, which means "to rebel." Confronted with Abraham's facility, Nimrod's authority fares no better
than Terach's. By the end of the story, both authority figures have
been deposed. At this point, Abraham's moral power - his faith becomes the agent of his brother's destruction. And so we have come

full circle: In the absence of any authority, either father or King,
Abraham succeeds in the destruction of his father's offspring and a
rival for his father's affection. "Hence it is written, and Haran died on
the face of his father Terach." In the reading I am suggesting, the
reference to Terach's face is to the competition between Abraham and

Haran for their father's affection. Here, the face represents an experientially grounded metonymy in which the face stands for the emotions

it displays. 53 In this revisionist reading, the story is not so much a tale
of the triumph of Abraham's monotheistic faith as it is a variant of a
systematic biblical theme about the rivalry between brothers that
54
starts with the story of Cain and Abel.
In these alternative readings, we have seen how a single schema

like the balance schema can nevertheless provide the structure for substantially different readings of the same story. In the section that follows, I will develop the idea that human cognitive processes are
systematic but still not determinate. I will discuss the process of extension by which basic story structure is elaborated to create both inventive, nonstandard narratives as well as more prototypical ones. I
53. This metonymy is used in the familiar expression: "When I saw you come in, my face lit
up." The use of this metonymy - in which the face is the source of love, blessing, and salvation
- appears elsewhere in the Bible. See Numbers 6:25-26 ("May God shine his face upon you and
be gracious to you. May God lift his countenance to you and give you peace."); Psalms 80:19
("God ...

shine your face and we shall be saved.").

54. See Genesis 4:1-15. In Nomos andNarrative, Cover traces the systematicity of the sibling
rivalry theme in the context of the ascendancy of the younger to the birthright of the elder.
Cover, supra note 10, at 19-24. For the attribution of sibling rivalry between Abraham and
Haran, see 1 D.H. FREEDMAN & M. SIMON, supra note 4, at 311, 312 & n.1 (the rabbis of the
midrash assumed that Abraham must have excelled Haran at everything). The connection between Haran's death and Abraham's striving for a monopoly on his father's affection is further
corroborated by what follows in the biblical text. Three verses after the report of Haran's death,
the Bible reports that Terach left on the trek toward Canaan and that he took Abraham, Abraham's wife, and Haran's orphaned son along. Genesis 11:31. It omits all mention of Terach's
third son, Nahor. See id. at 11:26.
Marc Fajer has suggested to me that the two readings of the midrash can be conjoined in a
way that supports the more traditional theme of faith. In this view, the theme of sibling rivalry is
a symbol for the competition between commitment to faith (Abraham) and expedience (Haran).
That competition is resolved when the father sees expedience die and accepts Abraham's commitment. He suggests that this may explain why Nahor, who is presumedly uncommitted, is left
behind.
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will explain as well how this systematic process of narrative construction so readily gives rise to a multiplicity of meanings.
B. Nondeterminacy in Elaborationand Interpretation
There is a powerful and pervasive illogic in much contemporary

discourse that equates the lack of objective foundations with the "radically indeterminate." Perhaps nowhere is this more annoyingly mistaken than in the vogue misidentification of the arbitrary with the

socially contingent. The mistaken premise of this syllogism is the assumption that the lack of objective foundations means that there are
no constraints.5 5 And, far too often, this yields the equally mistaken
assumption that any discussion of regularity in or constraint upon

meaning is necessarily a reintroduction of foundationalism.
These are not merely academic issues of only epistemological con-

cern. For many, the absence of grounding or foundations is a liberating phenomenon, "a momentary opening for other ways of being and
other forms of life."'56 They think they see a plasticity in the con-

structed nature of our cultural forms that permits dramatic, unconstrained social transformation. For those of us who perceive the

injustice of the current social order, this is a seductive vision because it
suggests a clear shot at effective social change. But it is mistaken,
doomed to failure because it does not understand or take into account
the constraints of the cognitive process, dependent upon experience for
the raw material of the models by which it constructs the world. Because many (maybe even most) idealized cognitive models are
grounded in social experience, these "raw materials" are often them57
selves cultural constructions shaped by normative social processes.
55. See TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1127-30. The pure social coherence view
understands internal consistency as the only test of meaning. Accordingly, it understands systems of meaning as chance products of history and tradition. This is the source of the equation
of the arbitrary with the socially contingent: If internal consistency is the only constraint on
meaning, then any given system must be arbitrary. And, if any given system is arbitrary, then it
follows that any given system can be replaced by any other, equally good system of internally
consistent meaning.
56. Boyle, Modernist Social Theory: Roberto Unger's Passion (Book Review), 98 HARV. L.
REv. 1066, 1081 (1985). But cf P. FEYERABEND, Notes on Relativism, in FAREWELL To REASON 19 (1987):
Neither [Protagoras] nor Herodotus asserted, as did other sophists and later "relativists,"
that institutions and laws that are valid in some societies and not valid in others are therefore arbitrary and can be changed at will. It is important to emphasize this point as many
critics of relativism seem to take the inference for granted: one can be a relativist and yet
defend and enforce laws and institutions.
Id. at 44.
57. This is the case with the ICM of mother, which is grounded in the social experiences of a
patriarchal society. See supranote 29. Moreover, the process of social construction is interactive
and multidimensional: The ICM and the language it motivates serve to encode, communicate,
and perpetuate the underlying social practices. For excellent articles that recognize the critical
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In this way, our very ability to construct a world is already constrained by the cultural structures in which we are enmeshed.
Cognitive theory recognizes the social contingency of these models
and affirms that they are subject to change. But, because these models
are socially reproduced at the level of cognition, they are very difficult
to change. The point of the experientialist endeavor is to empower
such change by bringing both the models and the means of their reproduction to consciousness. Even this is only half the battle, since cognitive success in remolding these models and changing our cultural
forms requires alternative grounds in experience. In the final section, I
discuss how narrative can be used to communicate these lived experiences to others even in the absence of objective foundations, determinate meanings, or shared, unmediated experiences.
The interpretive experience common to law and literary criticism
counsels that single, determinate, objective meanings are unattainable.
Nevertheless, our everyday experience consists of meaningful, even if
imperfect, intersubjective communication. For reasons I have developed elsewhere, the pure social coherence view of meaning does not
adequately account for this fact because it cannot explain how the system of social meaning is held together except by accident. 58 Accordingly, I have argued that meaning can only adequately be understood
as a product of a multidimensional cognitive process that is grounded
in our embodied experiences and elaborated imaginatively and nonobjectively by means of metaphor, metonymy, and socially con59
structed models.
To see meaning as grounded in experience is to reject both the kind
of determinacy promised by objectivist logic and the kind of arbitrariness assumed by most social coherence theorists. This is the import of
the coinage "nondeterminacy." What I intend to convey with this
term is a sense that humanly constructed meanings are not determinate, but are nevertheless framed and constrained by the systematic
nature of the cognitive processes. For example, it is hard to imagine a
human system of moral reasoning that does not involve and, in fact,
implications of the cultural grounding of behavior and experience, see Binder, Beyond Criticism,
55 U. CM. L. REv. 888, 909 (1988) ("The awful implication is that it is people's very psyches
that institutional structures hold together and that it is these psyches that, in turn, hold instrumental culture together."), and Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987) ("We do not recognize the ways in
which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which
those beliefs affect our actions."). See also Boyle, supra note 56, at 1083 ("The forms of domination ... reappear in [the] workplace and may be even more secure there because they are covered
over by the protective veil of familiarity.").
58. TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1121-29.
59. Id. at 1129-59.
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depend upon the balance schema. 60 But it does not follow that there is
anything determinate about human conceptions of morality. For the

balance schema structures conceptions of moral obligation as disparate as the retributive nostrum "an eye for an eye,"'6 1 its rabbinic interpretation as a requirement of monetary compensation for physical
damage, 62 and the conceptually more extended injunction of the New
Testament to "turn the other cheek."'63 To put it another way, human
conceptualizations of morality are not arbitrary in the sense that they
can be just anything. On the other hand, the imaginative, metaphoric
nature of these conceptualizations means that they can be many things
of a specified, related type.
It follows from this discussion that I do not offer an ICM of basic
story structure as a definition of the categorical, necessary, and suffi-

cient conditions of all stories. It is, after all, an idealized cognitive
model. As such, it is only a human construction that describes the
prototypical story. 64 To put it another way, the model describes the
conditions sufficient for an account to be recognizable as a story. It

does not purport to define or delimit the necessary conditions for
narratives.

Nevertheless, it does not follow that the elaboration of nonprototypical narratives is unconstrained or that the processes of elaboration are entirely arbitrary. Rather, other narrative forms are
understood by reference to and as variants of this idealized story structure.65 The simplest cases of nondeterminate structural elaborations

are the ones in which the narrator modifies the sequence of the elements of the story by, for example, sending the hero off on a journey

before the subject of the quest has been identified. 66 Other familiar
60. See M. JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 89-95; B. Buchanan, Moral Accounting (1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
61. Exodus 21:24.
62. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tractate Baba Kamma 83b.
63. Matthew 5:38-39 ("You have heard the saying, An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.
But I tell you, you are not to resist an injury: whoever strikes you on the right cheek, turn the
other to him as well .... ").
64. My use of the term, "prototypical" is technical. I refer to the cognitive phenomenon of
prototype effects in which certain category members are psychologically and cognitively more
salient than others. This perception of best examples of category membership is a function of fit
or coherence with the idealized cognitive model that structures the particular category. Because
the ICM does not express a 1:1 correspondence with the experience it organizes (that is, because
it is idealized), it will fit some category members much better than others. For further discussions of this phenomenon, see Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 10, at 1136-53, 1157-59;
Standing, supra note 22, at 1385-86.
65. Cf. P. RICOEUR, supra note 35, at 69 ("Innovation remains a form of behavior governed
by rules. The labor of imagination is not born from nothing. It is bound in one way or another
to the tradition's paradigms.").
66. See V. PROPP, supra note 37, at 107.
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examples include the flashback, a device familiar in film narratives but
no less common in visual narratives such as painting. 67 In any of these
cases, we can have the agon before the lack or even the denouement
before the introduction of the antagonist, etc. 68 Any of these "disordered" narrative configurations makes sense because the reader can be
expected to reconstruct and make sense of the story in terms of the
ICM of a prototypical narrative.
Most importantly, the very schematized nature of the ICM creates
the possibility of innumerable instantiations. The protagonist can be
hero or anti-hero. The antagonist slot need not be filled by an actual
villain, but can be instead the object of the protagonist's affection, as in
a romance. In this case, the agon is the pursuit and courtship, reflecting a cultural understanding LOVE ISWAR, as in the phrase "the battle
between the sexes" or the proverb "all is fair in love and war."'69 Or
the protagonist can be an idea, the antagonist another idea or theory,
via
with the rational argument serving as the agon of this "narrative"
70
the structural metaphor RATIONAL ARGUMENT IS WAR.
To return to more prototypical narratives, the antagonist slot can
also be filled by a character trait of the protagonist. In that case, the
agon can be the protagonist's struggle with his or her own character
flaw, as is common in classical tragedy. In this genre, the balance of
the narrative is often obtained by the use of the up-down schema and
the symmetry of the protagonist's rise to and fall from power. In
other cases, the narrative's agon need not produce a positive resolution
but can result instead in a lesson learned by the protagonist. This is
frequently the case in moral narratives like Aesop's Fables, where the
hero loses the confrontation with self or other but gains an insight
worth having.
The possibilities of elaboration are almost endless. Yet, the comprehensibility of each instantiation is maintained by the relative economy of structure that unites these quite varied narratives. Certain
67. See Goodman, Twisted Tales; or,Story, Study, and Symphony, in ON NARRATIVE, supra
note 18, at 99, 104-06.
68. Nabokov's Pale Fire provides an ingeniously constructed narrative in which the narrator,
a foreign-born college professor, misreads an entirely unrelated poem as a veiled reference to the
story of a deposed Eastern European monarch. The story is presented in fragments as line-byline notes to the text of the poem. V. NABOKOV, PALE FIRE (1962). The reader is thus challenged to reconstruct the story-line much as a detective - or academic - pieces together the
disparate pieces of an intellectual puzzle.
69. See G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 49.
70. Thus, for those who are curious, narrativeis the subject of this piece with free subjectivity
and unconstrained legal power serving as the antagonists. The essay is structured as a recursive
series of agones between narrative meaning and subjective power. Hence the title. I leave it to
the reader to determine the winner.
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elaborations become conventionalized as recognizable genres: the
myth, the folktale, the joke, the romance, the tragedy, the comedy of
manners, the novel of ideas, the academic essay. Thus, the category
narrative can be understood as a radialcategory 7 1 consisting of a central idealized model that both permits nondeterminate instantiations
72
and supports numerous conventionalized extensions.
Avant-garde narrative is a special kind of variant that requires additional attention because it seems in no way to fit the ICM that I have
described. To understand the phenomenon of avant-garde narrative, it
is necessary to delve a bit deeper into the construction of prototypical
narratives. In tracing the basic ICM of narrative and sketching the
means of its structural elaborations, I have only begun to describe the
possible complexities. Around the bare bones of this typical structure,
the narrator can hang the muscle of the particular plot, the sinew of
the connective episodes, the flesh of particular characterizations, the
pigment of descriptive or mood-defining passages, and as many layers
of conscious and unconscious meaning as the mind inevitably devises.
How is this done? Roland Barthes, for example, provides a microcosmic division of the functional units of narrative into nuclei, catalyzers, indices, and informants.73 Nuclei "constitute real hinge-points of
the narrative (or of a fragment of the narrative)." 7 4 Catalyzers
"merely 'fill in' the narrative space separating the hinge functions. ' 75
Informants identify the time and place of the story. 76 Indices, "a more
or less diffuse concept," are atmospheric, characterizational, psychological. 77 For Barthes, the nuclei can be related into a "logical succession" that he calls a "sequence." 7 8 He gives as an example "the
homogeneous group 'Having a drink.' "79 Each of these sequences
"constitutes a new unit, ready to function as a simple term in another,
more extensive sequence." 80
71. The term, "radial category" is a term of art in cognitive theory. See G. LAKOFF, supra
note 15, at 83-84. I provide more extensive explanations of the concept in TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1148-56, and Standing,supra note 22, at 1385-86.
72. Cf. P. RICOEUR, supra note 35, at 70 ("Rule-governed deformation constitutes the axis
around which the various changes of paradigm through application are arranged.").
73. Introduction to the StructuralAnalysisofNarraties,in R. BARTHES, supra note 42, at 9293, 96.
74. Id. at 93; see also id. at 98 (these "define[] the very framework of the narrative (expansions can be deleted, nuclei cannot)").
75. Id. at 93.
76. Id. at 96.
77. Id. at 92-93.
78. Id. at 101.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 102-03.
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This should sound like the description of the role of ordinary
ICMs in the construction of a literary passage that I gave above in
connection with the first half of the midrash. It is: Even without an
extra-narrative concept like ICM, Barthes has identified the role of the
ordinary cultural ICMs in forming the semantic units, if you will, of
narrative structure. Paul Ricoeur provides much the same account of
the "conceptual networks" that make up one's understanding of a concept like action.8' Ricoeur goes on to explain "narrative understanding" as both "presupposing a familiarity with the conceptual networks
constitutive of the semantics of the action" and "a familiarity with the
'82
rules of composition that govern the diachronic order of a story."
Or, in other words, narrative understanding requires general cultural
knowledge both of the ICMs of various everyday events and of the
ICM of narrativeby which they are configured into a coherent composition called a "story." Wheels thrust within wheels, again.
Particular instantiations of narrative have one additional dimension important to our inquiry. There is virtually no limit to the catalyzers that can be introduced between the sequences of a plot or the
nuclei of a sequence.
This generalized distortion is what gives the language of narrative its
special character. A purely logical phenomenon .... it ceaselessly substitutes meaning for the straightforward copy of the events recounted.
On a meeting in "life," it is most unlikely that the invitation to take a
seat would not immediately be followed by the act of sitting down; in
narrative these two units, contiguous from a mimetic point of view, may
be separated by a long series of insertions ....
* * * Distended, the functional nuclei furnish intercalating spaces
which can be packed out almost infinitely;
the interstices can be filled in
83
with a very large number of catalysers.
Thus, not only can individual stories instantiate and reorder the elements of the ICM of narrative in different ways, they can bend, shape,
and fill out the subparts of the narrative in diverse ways and to varying
degrees.
With this introduction, it should be easy to see how more avantgarde narrative is developed. In Stoppard's Rosencrantz and Guilden81. Ricoeur describes these "conceptual networks" as making up the reader's prenarrative
understanding of the world. He further explains that the narrator draws upon these preunderstandings - in his terminology, "prefiguration" or "mimesis " (mimesis-sub-one) - in relating
them together and composing the story. P. RICOEUR, supra note 35, at 55-56.
82. Id. at 56.
83. Introduction to the StructuralAnalysis of Narratives,in R. BARTHES, supra note 42, at
119-20. Barthes goes on to note some constraints inherent in the sequence and the medium.
With regard to the latter, he notes: "[W]riting contains possibilities of diaeresis - and so of
catalysing - far superior to those of film: a gesture related linguistically can be 'cut up' much
more easily than the same gesture [when] visualized ...." Id. at 120.
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stern Are Dead,84 for example, the narrative structure of the play is
parasitic on the story-line of Hamlet. It is the latter play which provides the more prototypical protagonist, antagonist, and agon; the narrative of the Stoppard play is an elaborate filling out of the interstices
of the plot from the point of view of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern,
two of Shakespeare's minor characters. Much of this intercalation
consists of extended waiting scenarios, with an extra dollop of ennui
and angst about the meaning of it all. Even so, Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern's ordeal consists of serial journeys (to Elsinore, to England) for unknown purposes and to unknown ends. Thus, the basic
configuration and meaning of the play is a composite of the simple
travel scenario and the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor.
To be sure, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern experience their own
agones - with the players, the pirates, and more deviously with Hamlet himself. But compared to the more structured agones of Hamlet,
theirs seem random and capricious. That, of course, is also part of the
intended theme: Because meaning is something that we as humans
construct, it is always easier to see order and structure in the lives of
others at a distance than it is to be certain of meaning and purpose
when confronted first hand with the uncontrollable contingencies of
one's own life.
Stoppard's play is, of course, influenced by Samuel Beckett's earlier Waiting for Godot. At first glance, the structure of Godot appears
to be even less obviously related to the ICM that I have described.
Yet, as Barthes points out, Godot can be understood as "yet another
game - this time extreme - with structure. '8 5 Beckett has simply
adopted and extended - in Barthes' terminology, "extensively catalyzed" - a basic waiting scenario.8 6 This is announced quite plainly
in the title and throughout the play.8 7 The central meaning of the play
lies in the rich entailments of the waiting scenario: Many people live
their lives waiting for some external force that will "fix" things or set
everything right. Religion - waiting for God or the Messiah - is
only one possible instantiation.
Moreover, Beckett employs quite conventional imagery to make
his allegory fully comprehensible. The action (such as it is) takes place
at the side of a road; Vladimir and Estragon are identified as fellow
travellers.8 8 Beckett thus explicitly evokes the travel scenario that is a
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

T. STOPPARD,

ROSENCRANTZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD (1967).
R. BARTHES, supra note 83, at 120 n.1.
Id.
See, e.g., Beckett, supra note 13, at 28 ("Time has stopped.").
The play begins with the stage direction: "A country road. A tree." Beckett, supra note
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predominant aspect of our conventional understanding of narrative.
Moreover, Beckett invokes other conventional metaphoric conceptualizations familiar to the literary tradition in addition to the LIFE IS A
JOURNEY metaphor. For example, Beckett identifies the character of

Pozzo with the conventional poetic metaphor A LIFETIME IS A DAY
and its related metaphor LIFE IS LIGHT. 8 9 Thus, in Act I, Pozzo counsels Vladimir and Estragon that "if I had an appointment with a...
Godot... I'd wait until it was black night before I gave up." 90 And,
in Act II, Pozzo (now blind) laments: "They give birth astride of a
grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more." 9 1
In this way, even nonstandard narratives like Godot are nevertheless comprehensible in terms of the same structural processes and conventional metaphors as more prototypical narratives. Indeed, the
strategy of even the most unstructured narrative is to draw upon the
reader's natural urge to seek order and meaning; this is the modus
operandi of the fully avant-garde work "which, as in Joyce's Ulysses,
challenges the reader's capacity to configure what the author seems to
take malign delight in defiguring. In such an extreme case, it is the
reader, almost abandoned by the work, who carries the burden of emplotment. '' 92 In fact, Joyce explicitly dares us to configure his work as
an ordinary travel scenario by giving the book the name of the hero of
Homer's Odyssey.
In this way, the category narrativeforms a radial category consisting of a central case and related conventionalized extensions. The central case of the category is structured in terms of the idealized
cognitive model I have sketched; the extensions are variants of this
structure, often configured in conventionalized genres. Even the most
13, at 3. For Beckett, such stage directions are an integral part of the play: "Though his plays
are abstract, they are rooted in particular environments - a country road with a single tree, an
old man's sparsely furnished den, a mound of earth. Symbolism rises organically from the material." Gussow, Critic's Notebook- Enter FearlessDirector,Pursued by Playwright, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 3, 1985, at 14, col. 3 (discussing threatened suit by Beckett against a production of Endgame
over change in scenery).
The characterization of the two protagonists as fellow travellers is made explicitly at the close
of Act I when Estragon says: "I sometimes wonder if we wouldn't have been better off alone,
each one for himself. We weren't made for the same road." Beckett, supra note 13, at 44 (stage
direction omitted).
89. On the systematicity of these metaphors in literature and everyday expression, see G.
LAKOFF & M. TURNER, supra note 15, at 6, 11-12, 27-34. Familiar examples are lines from a
Shakespearean Sonnet ("In me thou see'st the twilight of such day/ As after sunset fadeth in the
west") (Sonnet 73); Macbeth's soliloquy spoken just before his death ("Out, out, brief candle!")
(Macbeth, Act V, sc. v, 1. 23); and Dylan Thomas' poem, Do Not Go Gentle into that Good Night
(found in D. THOMAS, COLLECTED POEMS: 1934-52, at 16 (1952)).
90. Beckett, supra note 13, at 27.
91. Id. at 77-78.
92. P. RICOEUR, supra note 35, at 77; see also id. at 73.
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peripheral cases are nevertheless understood in terms of the model
from which they depart. In this way, the concept narrative is systematic and structured but nondeterminate in elaboration. "The same
concepts, rearranged, exchange, contradict, or invert their values and
their functions, until the resources of this new combinatorics are dissi'93
pated or simply exhausted.
Even so, flexibility of structure is not the primary source of the
nondeterminacy of narrative meaning. Rather, it is the ineluctable
process of cognitive mediation - what Ricoeur calls "the threefold
mimesis" 94 - that insures nondeterminacy. At no point in the narrative process is there a 1:1 correspondence between the content of the
narrative and a real world referent; at each of the relevant points, the
account is constructed, reconstructed, and re-constructed yet again.
The narrator does not tell his or her story from the raw, unmediated
data of life, but rather assembles and makes use of the preexisting cultural ICMs with which he or she apprehends the world. The narrator
then configures these nuclei to form a recognizable story-pattern with
an apprehensible meaning. By the time the reader confronts the story,
the original experiences and ideas have been twice rendered and
shaped by cultural and narrative forms. The reader inevitably transfuses the narrative with his or her own reconstructive effort, 95 decoding the plot and the message in relation to the ICMs that the reader
brings to the process of understanding and interpretation.
In this sense, nondeterminacy of meaning is a by-product of the
very process of communication itself. Communication is possible because humans share the experience of embodied interaction with the
environment. That interaction produces sub-linguistic structures the image-schemata - which are used to construct sense and meaning. Similarly, those within a culture share an unconscious stock of
cultural ICMs that, from an epistemic point of view, are no more than
useful cultural theories for organizing and making sense of a complex
experience. The very usefulness of these cognitive structures inheres
in their schematized, generalizable form; this, in turn, gives rise to
nondeterminacy in elaboration and interpretation. Communication is
93. From Mythical Possibilityto Social Existence, in C. LVI-STRAUSS, supra note 50, at 157,
172 (describing the "mysteriously prolific" dynamic of mythic thought).
94. P. RICOEUR, supra note 35, at 52-87.
95. On the role of reader response theory in literary interpretation, see generally S. FISH, Is
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 13 (1980) (stating the unqualified conclusion that formal units
are always a function of the interpretive model one brings to bear (they are not 'in the text')). See
also id. at 14 ("[i]t is interpretive communities, rather than either the text or the reader, that
produce meanings."); N. HOLLAND, supra note 16 (applying insights of psychoanalysis); N.
HOLLAND, THE BRAIN OF ROBERT FROST (1988) (applying insights of cognitive science).
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possible, but there are no guarantees. The reader may be constrained
to interpret a narrative by means of preexisting ICMs, and to do so in
a way that conforms to a cultural ICM of story-types. But there is
nothing that determines the particular instantiations chosen in the interpretive process. The reader attempts to conjure up the world view
of the ICMs invoked by the author and usually succeeds. But the
reader remains free to invoke alternative ICMs not intended by or not
shared with the author and, therefore, to construct alternative
meanings.
We have already seen how the midrash of Abraham and the idols
can be read in two very different ways, both of which conform to the
text of the story, its indices (like the name "Nimrod" and the biblical
referent "on the face of"), and the cognitive constraint of the balance
schema. These competing interpretations are each constructed relative to a different ICM that serves as an alternative template for organizing the meaning of the story. The traditional interpretation is
made possible by viewing the midrash relative to a paradigm of faith.
The revisionist interpretation is rendered by a reading of the same
story through the lens of a modern, Freudian paradigm. The traditional reading recreates the world view of the narrators and thus enables the reader to approximate the authors' intended religious lesson.
The revisionist reading assumes a different interpretive stance and
therefore reconstructs a story of sibling rivalry and Oedipal conflict.
From what we know about the rabbinic world view, we can readily
conclude that we have obtained a meaning different from the authors'
intent. But, from within the modern, psychoanalytic paradigm, we
can and do presume that we have reconstructed an unconscious mean96
ing perhaps unknown to, but nevertheless "intended" by the rabbis.
Not all alternative interpretations present themselves as potentially
coherent unconscious intentions of the author. A slight divergence of
culture between narrator and audience can sometimes make miscommunication inevitable. In Telling the American Story,97 Livia Polanyi
recounts just such a failure. She was teaching in Amsterdam at the
time. Her Dutch colleagues would ask why she had chosen to leave
behind friends, family, and country to accept an academic appointment in Holland. She would explain that she had moved because of
96. It is because there is an unconscious, unreflexive dimension to thought that there can be
"unintended" meanings that even the author might subsequently affirm. And, it is because this
unreflexive level of thought is structured by means of culturally shared ICMs that there appears
to be no discontinuity between the reconstruction of an author's "intent" and the "intent" or
"purpose" of a social practice. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 53-59.

97. L. POLANYI, TELLING THE AMERICAN STORY:
ANALYSIS OF CONVERSATIONAL STORYTELLING (1985).

A STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL
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the job and the opportunities it offered. Inevitably, her Dutch inter-

locutors would express puzzlement and disbelief. Despite her sincere
efforts at explanation, these conversations invariably ended with a
sense of distance, distrust, and betrayal. 98
Only after several years was Polanyi able to reconstruct the reason
for the miscommunication. She had given a truthful explanation that
reflected the cultural significance of work and professional ambition to
an American. Her Dutch interlocutors, however, interpreted the ex-

planation from a cultural perspective that did not recognize these as
proper topics of personal, intimate conversation. Relative to their assumptions about conventional motivations for life choices and proper
interpersonal communication, the American explanation that
"presented a self which was rational, sensible, businesslike, work-oriented, committed and serious," appeared to the Dutch interlocutors as
"cold, calculating, uncaring, work-obsessed, ambitious, and slightly
inhuman." 99 They therefore would conclude that the speaker "was
rejecting their attempts at intimacy by giving them a story which
could not possibly be believed." 10 0
Because narrative is a process that is constructed relative to such
98. Id. at 4-5.
99. Id. at 5. Some readers have felt that my accounts of cognition both here and in Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 10, focus too heavily on the cognitive processes of the individual to
the apparent exclusion of social and cultural forces. But, as discussed supra in text accompanying notes 57-58, the grounding of idealized cognitive models in social experience means that the

ICM operates as the internal cognitive agent of social construction. Cf Binder, supra note 57, at
907 ("It is the embodiment of [selfish instrumentalism] in the structures of everyday life - employment markets, factories, schools, singles bars, supermarkets, bureaucracies - that prevents
people from developing any alternative conception of self.").

For example, Polanyi's story nicely illustrates how the individual herself is socially constructed. As an American, the narrator has internalized a self-concept that includes a highly
individualistic, particularly American ICM of self that locates one's work, job, or career as cen-

tral to one's identity. In other cultures, however, differences in child-rearing practices and patterns of social organization provide experiences that ground a very different concept of self.
Thus, Alan Roland's psychoanalytic work in India and Japan led him to postulate a "familial
self" organized around "emotional connectedness and interdependence . . . where there is a
constant affective exchange through permeable outer ego boundaries" and where "the experiential sense of self is of a 'we-self' that is felt to be highly relational in different social contexts." A.
ROLAND, IN SEARCH OF SELF IN INDIA AND JAPAN: TOWARDS A CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 7,8 (1988). See also Grey, Holmes and LegalPragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 800

(1989) (For a pragmatist, "the individual person, the knowing, willing subject of Enlightenment
epistemology and political philosophy, is only the late and sophisticated product of a complex
cultural development."); Rorty, Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein, 15 POL. THEORY
564, 579 n.28 (1987) ("[Tlhe moral intuitions of the average middle-class member of a modern
Western society are contingent, fragile, precious creations, not the expression of something universally human.").
100. L. POLANYI, supra note 97, at 5; cf A. ROLAND, supra note 99, at 4 ("[Ihe intrapsychic self varies significantly if not radically according to the social and cultural patterns of
societies ....
[P]eople have a different experiential, affective sense of self and relationships, as
well as vastly different internalized world views that give profoundly different meanings to everyday experiences and relationships.").
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pregiven understandings, meaning and communication are vulnerable
to cross-cultural distortion. Because narrative meaning is an interactive process that requires reconstruction by the reader, reinserting the
ICMs of the story's nuclei back into their place in the story-line, it is
nondeterminate in interpretation. The process of construction by
which a wheel is thrust inside a wheel yields a way of reading that is
metaphorically close to Ezekiel's description of his vision, in which the
creatures could always face forward and, nevertheless, move in any of
the four directions.101
III.

NARRATIVE POWER AND INSTITUTIONALIZED
SOCIAL MEANING

One of the figures of the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe
was the magid, an itinerant teller of tales who spoke in the synagogues
on the Sabbath. One of these, the Magid of Dubno, was famous for his
ability to come up with just the right story or parable on any subject
for every occasion. An admirer once asked the magid how he did it:
How could he possibly learn and remember so many stories and parables? The magid responded with the following story:
A traveller walking in the forest came across an extraordinary
sight. On virtually every tree, there was a target with an arrow dead
center. Marvelling at the marksmanship, the traveller followed the
trail of bull's-eyes in search of the archer. Eventually, he came across
a small boy with a bow and arrow. The traveller asked the boy where
he had learned such skillful archery. "Well," the boy explained, "first
I shoot at a tree. Then I draw a target around the arrow."
"It's the same with me," said the magid. "First I find out the subject, then I make up a story to fit." 10 2
One naturally assumes that, within the complex of structure and
nondeterminacy I have described, the narrator remains entirely free to
express any message he or she desires. This common sense notion
seems yet more compelling when the narrator is a relatively unaccountable official like a judge, backed up by the power of the State.
How can the legal power of the judge be constrained by the concept of
narrative? What this question misses, however, is the degree to which
the judge, no less than others, is enmeshed in and dependent upon the
101. Ezekiel 1:17, discussed supra note 2.
102. This is the story as I remember it from childhood. Ausubel recounts the story differently: The marksman uses a gun and the targets are chalked onto a courtyard wall. But, more
important than these differences in instantiations, Ausubel's version contains a substantive difference. In his version, the magid uses the story to explain that he cannot concoct a story on every
subject, but rather collects good stories so that he is prepared for any occasion. N. AUSUBEL, A
TREASURY OF JEWISH FOLKLORE 4 (1948).
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structures of social meaning that make communication possible. In
this section, I will examine that phenomenon and explore the cognitive
role of narrative in law.
A.

The "Situation-Sense" of Legal Narrative

A judge may decide for ten reasons, but the judicial opinion need
reveal only one. For those who experience legal doctrine as virtually
infinitely manipulable, the doctrinal surface of the judge's opinion
merely conceals the subjective purposes, values, beliefs, and biases of
the particular judge or the cultural elite from which he is typically
drawn. 103 Still, as a practicing lawyer as well as an academic, I am
interested in locating and describing the remaining five unarticulated
components of judicial reasoning.
For many of us, the intuition persists that there is something there
1 4 My goal
some unifying construct or, perhaps, "situation-sense."'
in this section is to explain that intuition, but not to legitimate or justify it. The trajectory of my argument will be to explain what creates
the feel of objective justification, to expose it as a social construction,
and to locate the role that narrative plays in prefiguring that process.
Along the way, I shall be expressing a revisionist understanding of
Llewellyn's notion of situation-sense viewed as a descriptive concept
rather than a normative ideal.
As discussed in the introduction, the interpretive turn attempts to
defend and preserve vague coherence conventions in the face of increasingly devastating attacks on the traditional tools. Although this
position has many variants, the basic approach is to understand the
Constitution, judicial decisions, statutes, and other sources of legal
rules as texts to be read relative to the interpretive practices accepted
by a community of interpreters. Ronald Dworkin's version of this position takes the underlying metaphors of LAW AS NARRATIVE and
LAW AS LITERATURE

and makes them explicit. Law, he suggests, is

like a serial novel written by different authors who are constrained to
the degree that they accept an obligation to continue the same story.

On the other hand, many see the LAW

AS NARRATIVE

metaphor as

a basis for critique of the legal system. For Robert Cover, an understanding of law and narrative as "inseparably related" is central to an
appreciation of the inevitable "polynomia" of legal meanings that dif103. I say "he" because the vast majority of our judges, both state and federal, are males and white males at that. For an extended discussion of my divergence from the pure subjectivist
and relativist views characterized in the text, see TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10.
104. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 60-61, 122-23.
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ferent communities create. 105 In this view, the defensive invocation of
the interpretive turn founders on the problem of justification in the

absence of objective, epistemic foundations. There is much to this
view: Without a basis for law other than agreement amongst an elite

interpretive community, it is difficult to see how legal coercion can be
defended as legitimate.

I argue that the

LAW AS NARRATIVE

metaphor fails either to

ground or to account for the operation of the legal system. Those who
understand law and other social meanings as grounded only and entirely in narrative face a problem of circularity: How do different
members of the group arrive at the same understanding of the metanarrative? The problem with the "everything-is-narrative" account is
that it presupposes the very intersubjectivity it is trying to explain.
Moreover, both the legitimating and critical views of LAW AS NARRATIVE fail to capture fully the social and operational reality of law. Despite the heterodoxy of our society, the law functions because it "feels"
right a good deal of the time; there is a sense in which certain outcomes seem more legitimate than others. If not for that sense, no legal
system could survive without the constant exercise of raw, repressive
power.' 0 6 What is necessary for this perception of "legitimacy"?
In Part II, I suggested that both the construction and recognition
of narrative depends upon a shared but unreflexive model, a cognitive
template against which one unconsciously measures, evaluates, and
categorizes new input. It is the culturally shared ICM of narrative
that allows one immediately to recognize the novel, the midrash, and
the Apache historical narrative as examples of the same "thing," as
105. Cover, supra note 10, at 4-10, 40-44. Sandy Levinson extends the critique yet further
and deploys the LAW AS LITERATURE metaphor to argue for the radical indeterminacy of legal
meaning. Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373 (1982).
106. See Casebeer, Escapefrom Liberalism: Fact and Value in Karl Llewellyn, 1977 DUKE
L.J. 671, 693 ("That is, a society governed by a legal system may be stable either because the
norms of action are truly shared to a high degree or, momentarily, because the norms are imposed."); see also J. Deutsch, The Reality of Law in America: An Invitation to Dialogue 54-55
(1988) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) ("[W]e are faced with the task of persuading
those to whom the law applies, of arguing that what the court or regulator has done is valid. At
this point the question becomes one of communicating what will be accepted as truth, and that
truth must be capable of being stated.., in language that is persuasive of a substantive reality.");
Binder, On CriticalLegalStudies as Guerilla Warfare, 76 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (1987) ("Legal doctrine
... perpetuates injustice ... by helping to maintain allegiance toward the society as a whole. It
does this.., by invoking and honoring values widely, and falsely, attributed to that society.");
Minow, supra note 29, at 67 ("a conception of reality, when it triumphs, convinces even those
injured by it of its actuality").
For a thoughtful examination that criticizes prevailing assumptions about the relationship
between legal norms and cultural belief in the production of law-abiding behavior, see Hyde, The
Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 379.
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instantiations of the same process. 10 7 Moreover, I argued that the

meaning of any particular story is only possible because it is constructed of pregiven understandings of common events and concepts,
configured into the particular pattern of story-meaning.
The success of communication is dependent on these pregiven understandings. When the narrator and his or her audience share a set of

cultural ICMs, intersubjective communication proceeds as if unproblematic. This is our experience of everyday conversation with
family, friends, and colleagues. When the reader understands a story
relative to an alternative ICM, however, it is entirely possible for him
or her to interpret its meaning in a manner never contemplated by the
author. This is the familiar case in literary criticism; but it is equally
familiar as the means by which creative lawyers and judges read precedent. 0 8 When the narrator and the audience are attempting to com-

municate across cultural conventions, misunderstandings will be
frequent if not inevitable.
For a legal rule to function as "Law" in the absence of objective
foundations, categorical imperatives, or privileged access to the Fram-

ers' intent, the subjects of the rule must perceive it as "just the way it
should be."' 1

9

This occurs when the law is reflective of and structured

107. For a brief discussion of Apache historical narrative and its relation to the 1CM of
narrative,see supra note 39.
108. Compare, for example, Justice Brennan's account of the history of habeas corpus in his
majority opinion in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 411-26 (1963), with that of the majority of commentators. See Mayers, The Habeas CorpusAct of 1867. The Supreme Courtas Legal Historian,
33 U. CH. L. REV. 31, 58 (1965); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court - Habeas Corpus, 64
MiCH. L. REV. 451 (1966); see also Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142, 170-71 (1970); Developments in the Law - Federal
Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1045-50 (1970). Nevertheless, Justice Brennan's version remains both plausible and persuasive because it is reconceptualized relative to a modern
notion of due process. Characterized as "a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society
deems to be intolerable restraints," Fay, 372 U.S. at 401-02, it follows that "changed conceptions
of the kind of criminal proceedings so fundamentally defective as to make imprisonment pursuant to them constitutionally intolerable [do] not... obscure the basic continuity of the conception of the writ as the remedy for such imprisonments." 372 U.S. at 414.
Another example of the reconceptualization of legal history in terms of a modem constitutional paradigm is the argument made by Herbert Wechsler (and accepted by the Court) in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), that the challenge to the constitutionality of the
Alien and Sedition Acts "has carried the day in the court of history." 376 U.S. at 276. For an
alternative explanation of the Alien and Sedition Acts that locates these statutes in the mainstream of first amendment history, see TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1186-92.
109. Llewellyn discussed much the same idea in his diagnosis of what it might mean to talk
about "legal certainty":
And the certainty in question is the certainty after the event which makes ordinary men and
lawyers recognize as soon as they see the result that however hard it has been to reach, it is
the right result. Then men feel that it has therefore really been close to inevitable. Even
most losers, as the strife subsides, may be hoped to look back with something of such
understanding.
K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 185-86 (footnote omitted); accord Llewellyn, The Case Law
System in America, 88 COLUM. L. REv.989, 1013 (1988) (P. Gewirtz ed., M. Ansaldi trans.)

August 1989]

The Cognitive Dimension

2259

by the same idealized cognitive models that are used in the culture
generally. Thus, the social assent commanded by the legal enforceability of a bargained-for exchange is not a mere creature of the imposition of technical doctrines of consideration. Rather, it is a
nondeterminate product of the balance schema and of its centrality in
establishing a sense of closure and in structuring our understanding of
appropriate moral behavior. 110
With this preface, we can understand why narrative is insufficient

as a medium for the kind of institutionalized meaning that is necessary
if a prevailing order is to make persuasive its claims of legitimation
and justification. The process of legal legitimation that I have described requires three conditions for its success. First, for law to cover
the wide variety of fact situations to which it is to be applied, it must

be easily generalizable. Second, for law to appear as legitimate in the
absence of objective justification, it must evoke the kind of automatic
sense of validity - should we call it a "natural law response"? - that
is only provided by automatic, unreflexive cultural knowledge."'
(excerpts from K. LLEWLLYN, PRM;JUDIZIENRECHT UND RECHTSPRECHUNG IN AMERIKA
(1933), translated into English as K. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA
(forthcoming)):
Legal rules provide certainty in the affairs of people whose interests are affected by the law
if, in a lawsuit, they yield a result that accords with their real-life norms. Thus, the most
important legal certainty for those whose interests the law affects depends on whether the
judge can make the direction and degree of semantic change in a legal rule (or a verbal
symbol used by the rule) keep up with the corresponding change in the real-life situation.
But if the change sanctioned by the judge keeps up more or less, but not quite, then one
speaks of the law's mild conservatism. If the change on the judge's part is not noticeably
keeping up, then one speaks of crisis in decisionmaking. And, finally, if the change on the
judge's part is keeping up perfectly, neither judge nor layman realizes that any change has
occurred ....
110. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63; cf. P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND
LAW 173-74 (1981) (footnote omitted):
[T]he traditional explanation of an implied promise assumes that the explicit promise is the
paradigm case. The implied promise is then treated as a case where no explicit promise is
made in so many words, but where, from his words and conduct, it is plain that the party
intends to bind himself.... But there are difficulties with this traditional explanation. What
of the person who does not intend to pay.., for the meal supplied to him in the restaurant?
However, although it may well be true that a person who.., orders a meal in a restaurant, creates an expectation that he will pay an appropriate charge, and may, in that sense,
is
be taken to have made a promise ....it seems quite plausible to suggest that .... [i]t
because he is bound by an obligation that we feel impelled to imply a promise .... [T]he
is often, perhaps always, the
source of the obligation.., must be sought elsewhere.... [I]t
case that the conduct itself justifies the creation of the obligation. A person orders a meal in
a restaurant and the meal is laid before him, and he eats it. Surely these facts alone suffice to
create an obligation to pay.
111. See Lawrence, supra note 57, at 323 ("Because these beliefs are so much a part of the
culture, they are not experienced as explicit lessons. Instead, they seem part of the individual's
rational orderings of her perception of the world."); cf R. SCHAFER, ASPECTS OF INTERNALIZATION 109 (1968) ("The term reflective self representation refers to the implicit or explicit notation accompanying realistic thought that it is thought ... and not concrete reality. When the
subject suspends his reflective self representations, he disappears as thinker and experiences his
thoughts as though they were concrete realities."); P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 19,
at 21 ("The reality of everyday life appears already objectified .... The language used in every-
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Third, for law to function effectively and equitably, it must be communicated with as high a degree of relative reliability as possible.
Narrative cannot fulfill these conditions of generality, unreflexivity, and reliability in communication. First, narrative cannot structure
a category or a model. Because narrative comes with its instantiations

already in place, it can (at best) provide an example with which to
motivate a model. Second, the concrete, specific particulars of any
narrative require conscious mediation in the process of analogy neces-

sary for extension to other cases. Third, at the interpretive level, narrative engages the reader in a reconstruction that risks too great an

indeterminacy. The number of ICMs required to make sense of the
varied parts of a story (not to mention the larger paradigms relative to
which one may reinterpret a story entirely) leaves far too much room

for misreading the author's intent. Like Ezekiel's creatures, the peril
presented by narrative is that it will keep its face to us, but retain its
power to move off in any direction without warning.
This is the problem with Dworkin's analogy that compares law to
the writing of a serial novel, the chapters held together by a commit-

ment to the principle of "integrity." '1 12 As Stanley Fish has argued,
the authors of the subsequent chapters will be free to reinterpret the
plot, the characters, or the genre in ways that drastically change the
enterprise.11 3 For Dworkin's serial novel is bound together only by
the notion that the subsequent authors are committed to making the

novel "the best it can be."'1 14 But as Dworkin himself recognizes, the
conceptualization of "best" is itself relative to interpretive strategies

and commitments.115 The story will, therefore, always be subject to
radical reinterpretation and reconstruction in light of other ways of

being in the world - unless it has its own essence, its own fundamental quality. Dworkin, however, explicitly rejects such objectivist asday life continuously provides me with the necessary objectifications and posits the order within
which these make sense and within which everyday life has meaning for me.").
In a forthcoming essay, I describe this unreflexivity as a "simple state of transparency" that
can be overcome through the technique of "situation self-consciousness." Winter, Bull Durham
and the Uses of Theory 53-58 (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
112. R. DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 225-32.
113. Fish makes the strong assertion that any subsequent author will be exactly as free as the
first in exercising this capacity for choice. Chain Gang, supra note 7, at 555. One needn't go as
far as Fish, however, in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of the chain novel analogy. I
provide a weaker version of Fish's critique in the text that follows. In the final section, I explain
why I do not accept Fish's strong version of the critique. See infra note 170. For an extended
critique of the crypto-objectivist, all-or-nothing character of Fish's position, see my forthcoming
Bull Durham, supra note 111.
114. R. DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 229.
115. Id. at 53, 234-35.
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sumptions.1 1 6 He asserts instead that, as the story proceeds, the very
accretion of detail progressively constrains subsequent authors because
they must account for the data within their own interpretive concep17
tions of what a coherent story can be.'
While this position has some intuitive appeal, we have seen already
that it is incorrect. The accretion of detail does not foreclose other
interpretive understandings even within a single interpretive conception like the ICM of narrative. Because the ICM is sufficiently generalized to allow many instantiations, and because it is nondeterminate in
elaboration, the details of a given story can be reordered in terms of
many other points of view. Thus, Stoppard has no difficulty turning
the story-line of Hamlet into an existentialist meditation on the meaninglessness of life simply by changing the point of view from that of
Hamlet to that of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. 11 Similarly, there
was little difficulty in taking a completed story like the midrash about
Abraham and the idols and reinterpreting it in light of a Freudian
paradigm. Both the traditional version and my revisionist reinterpretation effectively account for the vast majority of the details, including
the hidden elements like the indices. Which makes the midrash the
best that it can be?
It is for this reason that the concept of narrative cannot explain the
perception of appropriateness that partially sustains the legal process.
Only a mental structure like an idealized cognitive model will meet the
threefold requirements of generality, unreflexivity, and reliability in
communication that are necessary to the operation of law. An ICM is
highly schematized, entirely unreflexive, widely shared, and regularly
applied. Its unconscious application produces prototype effects: regularized, core instantiations about which there will be little or no conflict within the culture.11 9 Thus, we can depend upon a meaningful
116. Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk
About Objectivity Any More, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 287 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed.
1980).
117. R. DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 234-35. Dworkin suggests that the character of Scrooge
in Dickens's A Christmas Carolis subject to many more interpretations at the beginning of the
story than he is after the dream sequence and repentance. Id. at 232-34. He acknowledges that
there is nothing objectivist about this alleged constraint, but rather that it is a function of "the
interpreter's aesthetic convictions ....
as much matters of judgment and conviction as" any
other interpretive choice. Id. at 234-35.
118. The English playwright Alan Ayckbourn has perfected the device of perspectival shift
into a high art. In his play, The Norman Conquests (1975), the events amongst an extended
family spending the weekend together in the parent's home is told through three performances
over three nights. Each night's performance covers the same time period and the same overall
events, but takes place in a different room of the house. By the third performance, the meaning
of the events viewed on the first night appears entirely different.
119. On the general phenomenon of prototype effects, see supra note 64. On the phenomenon of prototype effects in law, see H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (1961):
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degree of reliability in communication because of the culturally shared
nature of these cognitive models and their grounding in common experience. The experientialist concept of an ICM is, thus, the very model
of the kind of culturally self-justifying notion with which the law
might operate.
Llewellyn's concept of situation-sense is just such an attempt to
normalize legal decisionmaking in the vacuum that followed in the
wake of the legal realist attack on formalism. The primary thrust of
Llewellyn's conception is to account for and evaluate legal decisionmaking with something more than a subjectivist standard of "measurement by whether I the sparrow, with my bow and arrow, like the
1 20
specific outcome for a target":
For the standard of wisdom to which appeal is being made ... is not any
person's personal standard; it is rather a standard which aims to get idiosyncratic preferences largely hewn off until the standard becomes what
the courts also are reaching for: something which can be hoped, on
thought, to look reasonable to any thinking man; something that can
even be hoped to look reasonable in light of that uncommon sense, horse
sense. 121
Even though Llewellyn offered situation-sense as a normative ideal, he
denied any claim to objectivism: "[I]t is quite independent, I repeat, of
any philosophy as to the proper sources of 'Right Reason' which may
be held by any 'Natural Law' philosopher .... It answers instead to
1 22
current life, and it answers to the craft."
Despite these qualifications, Llewellyn's concept of situation-sense
has been almost universally criticized. The primary ground of criticism is that the concept does not acknowledge or leave room for the
There will indeed be plain cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which general
expressions are clearly applicable.... The plain case, where the general terms seem to need
no interpretation and where the recognition of instances seems unproblematic or 'automatic," are only the familiar ones, constantly recurring in similar contexts, where there is
general agreement ....
But compare Hart, The Separation ofLaw and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 610-11 (1958). I
discuss both the congruence of Hart's linguistic theory with experientialism and my critique of
his positivism in TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1172-80.
Dworkin's notion of a moral obligation to make something "the best it can be" is really only
a dressed-up version of the cognitive phenomenon of prototype effects. Something is only "best"
relative to an idealized model of what we think it should be. With this Dworkin agrees. See
supra text accompanying note 115. The instinct to read a text in a manner that puts it in its best
light is, then, not an essentially moral commitment to authorial integrity. Rather, it is part of the
basic cognitive impulse to configure new input in a manner that makes sense: to make it into a
coherent whole, a "best example" of an existing 1CM or reigning paradigm. Cf Fish, Dennis
Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1793 (1987) (describing Dworkins injunction as "the verbal equivalent of a pat on the back").
120. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 276.
121. Id. at 277. By "horse sense," Llewellyn meant "the balanced shrewdness of the expert
in the art." Id. at 121.
122. Id. at 422-23.
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inevitably subjective nature of judging. 123 This criticism is echoed today by those associated with Critical Legal Studies, who trace their
lineage to Llewellyn but reject his formulation as a mistaken objectiv-

ist bypass. 124 Situation-sense was also criticized as internally inconsis-

tent. 125 "[T]his vague, subjective principle is the keystone of a system
which is the antithesis of the subjective ....,,126 Perhaps the most
telling objection to the concept of situation-sense is that no one really
understood it. As one commentator put it, "situation sense may be a
Janus-faced concept."1 27 Its very novelty contributed to its obscurity:
"Grasp of the concept itself is made difficult by the fact that it bears
no marked resemblance to any previously offered guide ....
Nevertheless, Llewellyn's concept of situation-sense is remarkable

in its descriptive adequacy. For, although it lacks the formalized coherence of the experientialist construct of an idealized cognitive
model, situation-sense offers far more than the mere focus on context
it has sometimes been understood to recommend. 129 Rather, in Llewellyn's formulation, situation-sense encompasses precisely the qualities

of unreflexivity, cultural commonality, and experientially grounded
reason that cognitive theory attributes to the ICM.
Indeed, Llewellyn's notion of situation-sense incorporates virtually
all of the essential attributes of the idealized cognitive model identified
123. See, e.g., Clark & Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint andFreedom in the
Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255 (1961).
124. See, e.g., Fischl, Some Realism About CriticalLegal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 505,
520 (1987) ("To overstate the matter somewhat, the Realists [like Llewellyn] sought to substitute
one form of science for another."); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
1152, 1240-50 (1985); Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and JudicialMethod, 97 HARV. L. REV.
678, 704 (1984) (referring to the "quasi-empirical - and therefore determinate - activity prescribed by the method of situation-sense").
125. See Rohan, The Common Law Tradition: Situation Sense, Subjectivism or "Just-Result
Jurisprudence"?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 51, 63-64 (1963); see also Feinman, supra note 124, at
704-05 (arguing that, in determining the "type-situation," the level of categorization can always
be varied to yield any desired result). For a related discussion of legal argument as a process of
frame-shifting, see Jaff, Frame-Shifting: An Empowering Methodologyfor Teaching, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 249 (1986).
126. Clark & Trubek, supra note 123, at 261.
127. Rohan, supra note 125, at 56; see also Note, CommercialLaw and the American Volk:
A Note on Llewellyn's German Sourcesfor the Uniform CommercialCode, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 158
(1987) ("no scholar has been able to explain what Llewellyn thought 'immanent law' to be").
Llewellyn's concept of "immanent law", and its part in his conception of situation-sense, is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 136-46.
128. Rohan, supra note 125, at 71.
129. See, eg., Feinman, supra note 124, at 704-05. It still may not offer quite as much as
Llewellyn hoped. For although a legal decisionmaker may find an answer that feels both "right"
and "inevitable" because it fits an existing ICM, there may be other available ICMs that would
provide an answer that also has situation-sense. I discuss this phenomenon and the relative
constraints imposed by experience and cultural knowledge in Transcendental Nonsense, supra
note 10, at 1182-98.
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by experientialist theory; it lacks only an account of internal configuration. For Llewellyn, the concept of situation-sense was identified
with, if not identical to, the process of categorization: In defining his
concept, he stressed the distinction between the "facts of the individual case and the facts of the situation taken as a type."'1 30 He understood situation-sense as a gestalt structure.1 3
Moreover, he
recognized situation-sense as an extra-legal phenomenon fundamental
to human rationality:
In any event - and this holds of the legal concept which is relevant just
as it does of the life-situation - the sizing up of "the case" into some
pattern is of the essence of getting to the case at all, and the shape it
starts to take calls up familiar, more general patterns to fit it into or to
piece it out or to set it against for comparison. This much, as we all
know, is not a matter of method or desire, it comes close to being a
matter of necessity, it is
the way the normal human mind insists on work32
ing most of the time. 1
Llewellyn also understood this process as experientially based and
largely image-dependent: One obtains access to situation-sense by
"visualizing the hands-and-feet operations in the picture, seen as a going scheme, a working setup."' 133 Llewellyn saw this knowledge as
widely shared in the culture, ordinarily acquired through "such experience as, like driving a car or the party system or the Christmas season, comes to most Americans in the sheer process of survival to
130. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 122.
131. See id. at 427 ("'the' problem-situation extends as far as you are perfectly clear, in your
own mind, that you have grasped the picture fully and completely... and therefore know it to
present a significantly single whole") (emphasis omitted). On the gestalt nature of ICMs, see G.
LAKOFF, supra note 15, at 269-70, 302-03; TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1152-53,
1178-79.
132. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 268 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 261. In this statement, Llewellyn notes both the experiential grounding and image-based nature of the cognitive process. Llewellyn had noted the experientially-based nature of
reason much earlier:
We have discovered that rules alone, mere forms of words, are worthless. We have learned
that the concrete instance, the heaping up of concrete instances, the present, vital memory of
a multitude of concrete instances, is necessary in order to make any general proposition, be
it rule of law or any other, mean anything at all.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 12 (1930).

Llewellyn probably took the "form of words" chestnut from Holmes, who used it inconsistently if not cynically. Compare Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1919) (government's argument for admitting illegally seized evidence "reduces the Fourth
Amendment to a form of words") with Urofsky, The Brandeis-FrankfurterConversations, 1985
Sup. Cr. REv. 299, 334 (report by Brandeis that, in private, Holmes exulted "in the trick of
working out what he calls 'a form of words' to express desired result"). For an indication that
Holmes too recognized the image-based nature of linguistic meaning, see McBoyle v. United
States, 283 U.S. 25, 26 (1931) (Holmes, J.) ("in everyday speech 'vehicle' calls up the picture of a
thing moving on land."). For an excellent discussion of Holmes' jurisprudence as a model for
pragmatist legal thinking that recognizes the social-situatedness of all thought, see Grey, supra
note 99, at 798-810, 823-26. On the connection between Holmes' aestheticism and Llewellyn's,
see id. at 861-62.
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maturity."1 34 In other cases, where the knowledge is specialized, situ-

ation-sense was to come from the judge "who already knows the little
area or quirk of our culture which is the crux."1 35 Otherwise, the advocate must educate the court by providing that knowledge in briefs
136
and argument.
For all its perspicacity, there is something about Llewellyn's own
understanding of situation-sense that misled him to claim too much
for it as a normative ideal. 137 The classic statement of this claim provides a clue to the seeds of this misconception. In the best known
description of situation-sense in The Common Law Tradition, Llewellyn quoted the nineteenth-century German scholar Levin
Goldschmidt:
Every fact-pattern of common life... carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is a natural law which.., is not a
creature of mere reason, but rests on the solid foundation of what reason
can recognize in the nature of man and of the life conditions of the time
and place; it is thus not eternal nor changeless nor everywhere the same,
but it is indwelling in the very circumstances of life. The highest task of
law-giving consists in the uncovering and implementing of this immanent law. 138

Critics of this passage have identified its objectivist leanings, focussing
on concepts such as "immanent law," "natural rules," "right law" and
such. And the critics are correct in identifying the purely normative
dimension of this passage. Yet the passage equally proclaims its relativism, locating this hidden knowledge in "the life conditions of the
time and place" and maintaining that "it is thus not eternal nor
changeless nor everywhere the same."
It is not easy to harmonize these objectivist and relativist elements
in Llewellyn's description of situation-sense, although some have
tried. 139 The answer, I believe, is not to try, but to acknowledge that
134. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 251.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 211-12.
137. As one commentator quipped, "he forsook realism for idealism." Rohan, supra note
125, at 72.
138. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 122 (quoting L. Goldschmidt, Kritik des Entwurfs
eines Handelsgesetzbuchs, 4 KRITISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMMTE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 289 (1857)). This is the passage focussed on by Feinman, supra note 124, and Fischl,
supra note 123, and referred to in Note, supra note 127. The student note reports that Llewellyn
actually misidentified the source of the quote and locates the quote in a later work by Goldschmidt. Id. at 158 n.16. The note places Llewellyn's work in the context of the tradition of
German Romantic "Natur der Sache" jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. Id. at 159-61.
139. The most sophisticated - and most nearly successful - attempt is Casebeer, supranote
106. Yet even he recognizes that: "There-are passages seemingly impossible to reconcile." Id. at
697. Nevertheless, he argues that Llewellyn came close to discarding the fact/value distinction
and to articulating a vision of "law as grounded in shared 'fact-value' conventions." Id. at 701.
Twining suggests that Llewellyn's use of the Goldschmidt quote concerning "immanent law"
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Llewellyn was struggling to articulate an idea that was entirely novel.
He had no paradigm with which to capture and no language with
which to express both the dynamic, particular nature of experience
and the value-laden process by which humans categorize that
experience.14
The central precept of Llewellyn's realism, "see it fresh," was a reminder
of the need to stay close to the actual and the particular and thus to
avoid the chief pitfall of formalism, that of oversimplification . . .
whereas the other precept of realism, "see it whole," emphasized the
need for a coherent frame of reference. Cautious striving towards the
establishment of significant patterns, as embodied in the concept "situation sense," was Llewellyn's main formula for resolving the basic
dilemma.141
But, despite his brilliant efforts, Llewellyn was a victim of this very
basic dilemma. One of its manifestations was the distorted agglomeration of objectivist and relativist elements in a single normative formulation. Situation-sense was Llewellyn's effort from within the
distorting conceptual apparatus of the subject/object dichotomy 14 2 to
capture the role of idealized cognitive models in legal analysis.
Llewellyn had no paradigm with which to describe the feel of objective justification that I called the "natural law response." In the
absence of a formalized construct like an idealized cognitive model, he
could not capture the automatic, unreflexive sense of validity that he
described.14 3 Elsewhere in The Common Law Tradition, Llewellyn explicitly acknowledged that this perception was a function of cultural
knowledge. He made clear, moreover, that the methodology of situation-sense was not a search for "natural law" as the Goldschmidt passage seemed to claim. But he lacked a way to talk about the quite
indwelling
structured feel of the phenomenon. "Immanent law ....
in the very circumstances of life" was as close to the unconscious experience of cognitive structure as Llewellyn could come. Llewellyn was,
therefore, vulnerable to the error of appearing to advocate reliance on
naked social coherence as a sufficient normative ground for legal decision. And, from all appearances, he seems in fact to have succumbed
to it.
was aberrational and a function of its similarity to a passage by Llewellyn's teacher, Corbin.
"[His enthusiasm for the Goldschmidt passage might be explained in part by a feeling that he
'recognized' it without realizing why it seemed familiar." W. TWINING, supra note 14, at 224.
140. Casebeer, supra note 106, at 697 ("one should expect such difficulty given a very different dominant tradition subverting the language in another direction").
141. W. TWINING, supra note 14, at 369.
142. For a discussion that locates Llewellyn's work on the object side of this dichotomy, see
Peller, supra note 124, at 1240-45, 1247-50.
143. See supra note 109.
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With the advantage of intellectual hindsight, however, it is a simple matter to expose as a social construction the feel of objective justification provided by this model of legal reasoning. In a recent article, I
demonstrate how cultural ICMs structure a simple legal command
like H.L.A.Hart's rule prohibiting vehicles in the park and more complex doctrinal areas like the first amendment. 144 But there is nothing
objective or foundational about this process of legal reasoning. An
ICM is an experiential gestalt identified by a culture because it is a
useful but not objective way to organize experience. Moreover, an
ICM often entails socially contingent, normative accounts of experience as in the case of mother or in the invocation of the market metaphor to structure the concept of free speech. 14 5 Both the ICMs used in
ordinary interactions and the specifically legal ICMs used to structure
doctrine are cultural artifacts encoding particular and contingent normative conceptions.
To say this is, in the end, not to criticize Llewellyn at all. For
whether recognized as a cognitive function employing idealized cognitive models or denominated situation-sense, the process of legal reasoning remains a culturally-bound phenomenon. Llewellyn would
plainly agree. 146 The process is a creature of "the life conditions of the
time and place; it is thus not eternal nor changeless nor everywhere
the same," even if we do sometimes experience it as "indwelling in the
very circumstances of life." 147
B. Legal Narrative and Social Constraint
In saying that narrative is not a durable generator of legitimacy, I
do not ignore its long association with law. The entire Jewish tradition of midrash, of interpretive storytelling, is a tradition of lawmaking. 148 But, in my view, narrative plays only an intermediate role in
this process. Consider, for example, the role of narrative in midrashic
lawmaking.
In Genesis, the Bible tells the story of God appearing to Abraham
as he was sitting at the door of his tent in the heat of the day. Accord144. TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1172-95.
145. In the case of mother, the cultural assumptions are those of a patriarchal, nuclear family. See supra note 29. In the case of the market metaphor for the first amendment, the assumptions relate to the presumed value of competition and laissez-faire economics. See supra note 31.
146. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 133, at 117:
As to tools, law has borrowed copiously from the rest of culture: language, logic, writing;
and for the subject matter of its thinking it borrows the whole stock of practices, standards,
ethics that make up the social, economic and religious phases of society. What is dominant
in society, then, is dominant in law.
147. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 122.
148. Epstein, supra note 4, at x-xiv.
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ing to the midrash, Abraham was recuperating from his circumcision,
49
which is reported in the immediately preceding chapter of the Bible. 1
The rabbis of the midrash interpreted this story as the source of the
obligation of bikur cholim, of visiting the sick. 150 In the next several
verses, the Bible reports that Abraham ran to intercept three travellers
(who later turn out to be angels), and invite them to dine.' 5' The
rabbis of the midrash interpreted this story as a source of the legal
52
obligation of hachnasot orchim, of entertaining strangers.
One can understand this process of lawmaking through storytelling in two ways. In the first, the authority of this process is external to the story; it is hierarchical and inheres in the theological
authority of the storyteller. In the second, the power of the narrator
to create social meanings that will be understood as law is constrained
by the available social understandings or mores. From this perspective, the trajectory of the story about Abraham and the three travellers
is not from narrative directly to demand, but from practice to story to
custom. The role of the rabbi is more that of midwife than mother;
the role of the narrator is to concretize and communicate preexisting
social practice in a way that will preserve and institutionalize it as a
cultural norm.
Even so, this form of narrative is truncated, simple and highly formalized. We can see this same phenomenon in the case of an American cultural narrative like the "Horatio Alger story." Once an
extensive oeuvre of over forty very specific novels and short stories
written by the nineteenth-century author Horatio Alger, 153 the concept of an "Horatio Alger story" has become a schematized "rags to
riches" folk model that is a cultural template with which to measure a
wide variety of social data from conversational stories' 54 to legal concepts like affirmative action.15 5 Once again, the trajectory is from the
149. Genesis 17:23-27.
150. Commentary of Rashi on Genesis 18:1 (.'And He [God] appeared to him': To visit the
sick .... [I]t was the third day after his circumcision and the Holy One, Blessed Be He, came
and asked after his welfare.") (citing BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TractateBaba Metzi'a 86b).
151. Genesis 18:1-4.
152. See 1 D. FREEDMAN & M. SIMON, supra note 4, at 414.
153. See, e.g., H. ALGER, BOUND TO RisE (1873); H. ALGER, MARK THE MATCH BoY
(1869); H. ALGER, RAGGED DICK (1868); H. ALGER, STRONG AND STEADY (1871).

154. Cf L. POLANYI, supra note 97.
155. "Underlying much of the opposition to affirmative action is the myth that the American
dream of success is based on merit, and that affirmative action undermines this system by ignoring merit in distributing rewards." Ellis, Victim-Specific Remedies: A Myopic Approach to Discrimination, 13 N.Y.U. REV. LAW & SOC. CHANGE 575, 591 (1985); see also id. at 603 ("The
American has thrived on the stories of individuals like Horatio Alger, whose examples offer the
promise that success can be achieved through hard work.").
The "Horatio Alger" folk model is shared even by proponents of affirmative action. In
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social experience of pioneers and immigrants in the nineteenth century
to specific narrative formulations and then to a stylized cultural
model.
In a recent article, I characterize Robert Cover's notion that law is
156
expressed as a "redemptive story" or "narrative" of a social struggle
as corresponding to my explanation of legal reasoning as structured by
means of ICMs grounded in social experience. 157 I argue that his notion of cases falling within the "central thrust" or "margin" of such
"narratives" corresponds with my suggestion that legal doctrines are
radial categories whose directive force is strongest at the core and
weakest at the periphery.1 58 What makes Cover's conception fundaUnited Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), for example, the Court upheld a voluntary
affirmative action plan in the face of a Title VII challenge. The majority opinion noted that "[i]t
would be ironic indeed" if affirmative action were barred by "a law triggered by a Nation's
concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had 'been
excluded from the American dream for so long.'" 443 U.S. at 204 (quoting remarks of Senator
Humphrey, 110 CONG. REC. 6552 (1964)). In this view, affirmative action provides access to the
American dream by serving as "an impetus to the process of dismantling the barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past practices." United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 156 (1987)
(Brennan, J.) (quoting NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974)). Thus, it is quite
natural to find a proponent arguing that "[a]ll of the affirmative action programs considered by
the Supreme Court in the last decade provided minorities with opportunities for self-support and
self-advancement in the form of education, job training, business opportunities, or employment."
Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the FourteenthAmendment, 71 VA.
L. REV. 753, 796-97 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
As shaped by this dominant folk model, the desired end-goal of affirmative action is "a climate in which objective, neutral ... criteria can successfully operate to select ...solely on the
basis of ... merit." Paradise,480 U.S. at 156 (Brennan, J.) (quoting Allen, 493 F.2d at 621).
Thus, recent Supreme Court opinions upholding affirmative action plans have emphasized the
degree of merit-based competition provided for by the plan under review. In Paradise,for example, the Court concluded that: "Finally, the basic limitation, that black troopers promoted must
be qualified, remains. Qualified white candidates simply have to compete with qualified black
candidates." 480 U.S. at 183 (emphasis added). And in Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency,
480 U.S. 616 (1987), the majority maintained that the affirmative action plan upheld the basic
premise of the American dream. "Similarly, the Agency Plan requires women to compete with
all other qualified applicants. No persons are automatically excluded from consideration; all are
able to have their qualifications weighed against those of other applicants." 480 U.S. at 638
(emphasis in original). But see 480 U.S. at 674-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the practice under the plan made meaningless the competition described by the majority). In contrast,
the Court's recent decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989),
struck down a racial set-aside in part because it was seen to conflict with the folk model of
competition and individual achievement based on merit. See 109 S. Ct. at 727 ("The dream of a
Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences .... ").
156. Cover explains the decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishops, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), in terms
of the conflict between "the redemptive story of the [labor] struggle" and the "narratives of free
exercise." Cover, supranote 10, at 63. Similarly, Cover explains the decision in Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), as a function of "the central redemptive narrative of the
struggle for racial equality and for desegregation of the nation's schools." Cover, supra note 10,
at 65.
157. TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1194 n.307. For an explanation of how
ICMs structure legal reasoning, see id. at 1182-85.
158. Id. at 1194 n.307.
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mentally different and richer than Ronald Dworkin's concept of law as
a serial novel? Cover's narratives are the products of the embodied

experiences of committed people. Dworkin's serial novel, on the other
hand, is bound together only by abstractions of principle.
Nevertheless, I would suggest that Cover's "narratives" are themselves best understood not as prototypical stories of specific historical
events. Rather, if they are to operate meaningfully as law for the

group, they must make the transition from specific historical narratives to stylized cultural constructs that operate as idealized cognitive

models. In this view of his work, the phenomenon of polynomia that
Cover describes is not a function of the subjective power of the various
narrators, but rather a nondeterminate product of the imaginative cognitive constructions of different social experiences.
Thus, to tell a story that will be both meaningful and compelling,

the judge or other legal storyteller must make use of preexisting cultural knowledge in ways that will seem natural to those subject to the

legal rule because already grounded in social experience and mediated
by existing cultural models. We can think of the effective legal storyteller as one who "retails" cultural knowledge from the stock of practices produced by the culture at the "wholesale" level.' 5 9 This view of
lawmaking acknowledges that those who comprise the legal hierarchy

do exercise substantial power in choosing legal rules or cultural
norms; they may pick and choose from amongst a broad stock of prac-

tices those that will be institutionalized in legal rules.
This process nevertheless entails important cultural constraints on
the legal storyteller. For, if the legal rule is not already grounded in

social experience, the legal stories told by those who would make law
will seem arbitrary and illegitimate. Unless grounded in these ways,

legal stories run the risk that they will founder in the face of social
discord, overt defiance, or failed communication. The statute books
159. See J. Deutsch, supra note 105, at 103 (describing Holmes' approach to lawmaking as
working "as all good stories work, not by retailing the murky and confusing truth of how things
are, but by confirming our felt certainties about how we know they should be."). Much the same
process is at work when stories are used by those who wield political power to sell policies or
candidates to the electorate. The power of the Willie Horton commercials used by those supporting George Bush's candidacy in the fall of 1988 lay precisely in the appeal to the kind of deepseated social stereotypes of antisocial black sexuality so eloquently depicted and critically examined by Eldridge Cleaver 20 years ago. E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 13-15, 163-65, 178-90
(1968); see also J. WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE 116-17, 184-89 (1984) (describing the
cultural construction by racial radicals in the late nineteenth-century South of the "problem" of
black-on-white rape); Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV.
187, 233 n.220 ("The spectre of rape was the central justification of lynching.") (citing A. DAVIS,
WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 189-90 (1981); J. HALL, REVOLT AGAINST CHIVALRY:

JESSIE

DANIEL AMES AND THE WOMEN'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST LYNCHING 112, 147 (1979)). The cognitive dimension of this phenomenon, which I denominate as the process of "affective" storytelling, is explored further in the next section.
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and case reports are littered with the evidence of just such failures.
"Separate but equal" could not withstand the realities of segrega16 1
tion 160 and the determination of its victims to have their story told.
Enforcement does not keep up with illegal demand, whether the ban is
that of prohibition in the 1920s or the drug laws today. And the informer statutes, nineteenth-century laws that provide for private attorney general actions by any citizen with information about the alleged
illegality, stand mute on the statute books in the face of the wide cultural acceptance of the individualist premises that lie behind the
162
much-criticized standing doctrine.
IV.

SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT THE
TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF NARRATIVE

I have suggested that narrative's communicative capacity is rooted
in the way that the mind interprets, processes, and understands information. I have argued, nevertheless, that narrative has distinct limits
as a tool of legitimation and that the narrative process is itself constrained by preexisting social understandings and practices. By this
point in the argument, I trust that the reader will not mistake this
description of cognitive constraints for an assertion of determinacy.
There is nothing that requires any storyteller to tell a particular story
or to tell it in a particular manner. We use stories all the time in an
effort to persuade others to change their views or understandings.
How does this work if our communicative success is limited by the
prior experiences or understandings of the audience? And, if legal
narratives are subject to social constraints, how can storytelling be
used by the disempowered to effect social and legal change?
To explain this apparent conundrum, it is necessary to return to
and stress three points about the cognitive sketch I provided in Part II.
160. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (If "the assumption that the
enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored with a badge of inferiority... be so, it is
... solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.") with Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) ("To separate them.., solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.... Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.").
161. For the eloquent telling of this epic of bravery, resourcefulness, and commitment, see R.
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975). Cf P. RICOEUR, supra note 35, at 75 ("We tell stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit being narrated.... The whole history of
suffering cries out for vengeance and calls for narrative.").
162. Standing,supra note 22, at 1406-09. In the revision of the Judicial Code in 1948, a 1792
statute (previously codified at 28 U.S.C. § 823) governing the award of costs in informers' actions
was deleted as obsolete. Id. at 1408 n.194. In fact, there were then and are now still two informers' statutes on the books. 25 U.S.C. § 201 (1982) (actions to collect penalties for violations of
certain Indian rights); 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730 (Supp. 1989) (actions for fraud against the
government).
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The first is that the cognitive process is fundamentally imaginative
rather than mechanical. We understand and construct our world by
imaginative connections through metaphor, metonymy, and the imaginative extension of idealized cognitive models. The second is that we
share an ICM of narrativethat depends upon and encodes a particular
way of making sense of the world. The third is that, although idealized cognitive models are grounded in experience, they are not objective representations of that experience but idealized more-or-less
characterizations. These three points are, jointly, the fulcra of the success of three types of prescriptive narratives: what I shall call affective,
persuasive, and transformative storytelling.
When someone tells us a story, he or she invites us to enter a constructed world. Because we share basic cultural assumptions about
how that world is constructed, we know that we are being asked to
view that constructed world from a very particular point of view: that
of the protagonist. And we usually do. We are able to because the
ICM of narrative is structured by means of the source-path-goal
schema and grounded in our common experience of journeys. We imagine ourselves as the protagonist and picture ourselves in the protagonist's shoes as we proceed from introduction to conclusion. Our very
success in understanding the story is simultaneously the narrator's
success in persuading us - at least temporarily - to imagine the
world in a particular way.
This explains the first, affective way in which narrative persuades.
The narrator invokes an existing storyline or ICM familiar to the audience. In this storyline, the narrator inserts a "nontraditional" protagonist. A black or woman works hard, obtains professional skills, and
rises through the social strata only to be stopped by a discriminatory
promotion decision that prefers a white male. Part of the power of
this tale resides in its invocation of the cultural model of the "Horatio
Alger story." We believe that hard work pays off and that merit is
rewarded even in the face of frequent lessons to the contrary. We believe it because, in our culture, we use this ICM to account for our
experience; it is how we understand our world. The job of the advocate is to take the raw data of the client's story and reformulate it to
conform to such an ICM and, therefore, to structure for the legal decisionmaker a sense of the situation that suggests only one specific
63
outcome. 1
163. See Lpez, supra note 27. Perhaps the pithiest expression of this cognitive process is the
admonition with which Herbert Wechsler regaled my first year class in criminal law. "In every
murder case," he told us, "there are only two issues: Did the deceased deserve to die and, if so,
was the defendant the person to do it?"
The example given in the text illustrates the problem I have with Clark Cunningham's other-
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We can confirm the power of this process by considering the occasions in which the narrator fails: those cases in which the audience is
unpersuaded and refuses to accept the characterizations of events "imposed" by the narrator. This response may be especially strong even violent - if the audience is being asked to see protagonists and
villains that do not fit its concepts of identity and order. 164 The white
male judge who unconsciously harbors stereotypes about blacks and

women may react with disbelief because he cannot accept the narrator's characterization of protagonist and villain. 165 The reaction will
wise thougtful account and explanation of his lawyering experiences in terms of the metaphor of
lawyering as translation. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking about Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989). Cunningham's metaphor is valid in certain circumstances. But it seems to assume a kind of legal ethnocentricity that sees legal "language" as
separate and apart from lay "language." In fact, however, legal language is largely continuous
with lay language in at least two ways. First, and most obviously, legal language makes use of
many of the same terms and, thus, underlying understandings as ordinary English. We saw an
example of this in the notion of "contract." See supra text accompanying notes 110, 144-46.
Second, as illustrated in the case of the "Horatio Alger" folk model, lawyers, judges, and lay
persons are all situated members of the same general culture. Accordingly, they cognize their
world, are affected by, and act in accordance with the same set of powerful cultural constructs.
See supra text accompanying notes 159-62. Thus, in many such cases, the role of the lawyer is
not to translate so much as to facilitate the client's own version of his or her story.
This is not to say, however, that there are no specifically legal ICMs; law can be conceptualized as a dialect or subculture. In cases in which the legal and lay subcultures conflict, Cunningham's model is a sensitive and useful way to conceptualized the problems of advocacy.
164. Seymour Chatman's essay about film narrative provides an example of this process. In
his paper, Chatman describes how Jean Renoir's film adaptation manages effectively to capture
and translate Guy de Maupassant's short story Une Partie de Campagne. De Maupassant describes Henriette: "She was a pretty girl of about eighteen; one of those women who suddenly
excite your desire ...... Chatman, supra note 47, at 126. Chatman explains how Renoir conveys
this idea by using the camera to show the point of view of several men of different ages and social
situations as they are all drawn to admire Henriette on a swing. Id. at 126-35. Chatman reports
that, at this point of his paper, several conference participants objected to the sexism of the
description. "The objection seemed to be not about the voyeurism itself but about the willingness
of the members of an audience to go along with it." Id. at 135 n.4. Chatman defends his scholarly effort:
The kind of identification that I was discussing is . . . purely aesthetic. A reader must
obviously be able to participate imaginatively in a character's set of mind, even if that character is a nineteenth-century lecher.... Imaginative participation in the point of view of
fictional characters... in no way implies moral endorsement. It is simply the way we make
sense.., out of unusual or even downright alien viewpoints.
Id. at 135 n.4. What Chatman misses, of course, is that this process of imaginative participation
is the very gist of the criticism: The perniciousness of this particular narrative is that, to understand the story, the audience is being asked to - and does - go along with the act of voyeurism.
The complaint is precisely moral: that the audience becomes an accomplice in the narrator's
sexism.
165. [There are psychic rewards in self-flattering generalizations.... [I]t's a rare person
who isn't delighted to hear and prone to accept comparative characterizations of ethnic or
other groups that suggest the relative superiority of those groups to which he belongs....
... By seizing upon the positive myths about the groups to which they belong and the
negative myths about those to which they don't, or for that matter the realities respecting
some or most members of the two classes, [lawmakers], like the rest of us, are likely to
assume too readily that not many of "them" will be unfairly deprived, nor many of "us"
unfairly benefitted ....

J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 158-59 (1980); see also Lawrence, supra note 57, at 338-39
("[O]ur culture often supports and rewards individuals for making hostile misjudgments that
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be: "that's a good story, Counselor, but what about the fact that...."
If the judge is the legal storyteller and the losing victim of discrimination the audience, the roles will be reversed. The opinion will invoke a stylized cultural story presenting, for example, the picture of
beleaguered management caught in the vise of "unqualified" minority
applicants who cannot live with their disappointment and "bleedingheart" civil rights laws left over from the "misguided" sixties. In that
case, the victim will not recognize his or her experience in the tale told
by the narrator. The reaction will be that "the judge is just exercising
raw [narrative] power."
I have called this use of narrative merely affective both because of
the temporary nature of the persuasion and the degree to which it appears dependent upon the audience's predispositions and commitments. How does the advocate or storyteller actually persuade
someone to change his or her position? The answer lies in the epistemic role of experience. The advocate's repertoire is not limited to the
offer of alternative ICMs, which the decisionmaker may accept or reject on the basis of its precommitments. Rather, the advocate can
adopt an educative strategy designed to bring the court to see a situation in a substantially new way.
The key to such a strategy is the understanding that although categories are socially constructed, it does not follow that they are arbitrary or that, in any given case, they can be anything. Rather,
categories work or don't work, fit or don't fit, given the available experience and information they are being used to organize. Thus, the advocate can offer concrete facts and experiences that make the court's
ICM inapplicable and another ICM more obviously so. Knowing that
the decisionmaker may approach a legal problem in one way, the advocate can tell a story that simply does not fit with the tribunal's sense
of the situation. The sheer force of detail can be used to press the
tribunal to rethink the situation, to recategorize a case as an exception
to its dominant paradigm and an instance of another ICM. This is the
proverbial "smoking gun": that key fact which is inconsistent with
one view of the situation and, at the same time, a prototype of another
ICM. The advocate can construct a story that is persuasive because it
provides a more coherent version of the facts presented; it is persuasive
precisely because of its appeal to the basic cognitive impulse to organize and make meaning in experience.
Llewellyn provides two salient examples of this process in his deexaggerate the differences between themselves and members of a racial out-group.... In ambiguous social situations, it will always be easier to find evidence supporting an individual's assumed
group characteristics than to find contradictory evidence.").
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scription of situation-sense in operation. In the first, the New York
courts had held that oral contracts to transfer credit were subject to
the statute of frauds and therefore unenforceable. He describes the
successful argument of counsel in the next case:
I wish I might have had that oral argument to make: the almost startling picture of a major international bank's foreign exchange expert at
work in an unstable, still free, market, with four assistants and ten or
more telephones all busy as offers in the tens or hundreds of thousands
are received and held open during a lightninglike shopping around, or
are made and held "firm for three minutes" or are "closed" by word of
mouth in closings that have to mean binding obligations. It was such a
picture of the type-situation which knocked out the Statute of Frauds
....

which the court does not quote ....

[W]hat we have is advocacy

informing the court.., about wise choice of concept and consequent
rule... informing so persuasively that the court turns its back on the
plain text of a statute to strong-arm an exception .... 166
In this case, the advocate tells a story of the actual "hands-and-feet
techniques of commercial bank operation" 167 that does not permit the
sensible application of a category constructed for other circumstances.
The second example is the "managed series of educational cases,
judiciously selected - even at times arranged - to bring a court or
the courts along by gentle stages of understanding." 168 A now-familiar example is the litigation strategy that led to Brown. 169 In this process, the advocates slowly expose the courts to ever greater accretions
of experience that do not fit the reigning legal paradigm until, ultimately, the courts are led to reformulate the available models to fit the
experiences they had previously ignored. 170 Here, we have crossed the
166. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 211-12 (footnotes omitted) (describing Equitable
Trust Co. v. Keene, 232 N.Y. 290, 133 N.E. 894 (1921)).

167. Id. at 212.
168. Id. at 262.
169. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at
262-63. Brown was the culmination of a conscious process of litigation strategy that began in the
early thirties. The heroes and architects of this triumph of advocacy include not just Thurgood
Marshall, but also Charles H. Houston, William H. Hastie, and Nathan Margold. See, e.g., R.
KLUGER, supra note 161, at 132-36, 155-65, 186-94, 202-06; M. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's
LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 21-48 (1987).
170. Cf Cornell, Institutionalizationof Meaning, Recollective Imagination, and the Potential
for TransformativeLegal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1170 (1988) ("The irreducible
exteriority, or the inevitable residue of materiality in history, does not stand completely outside
of interpretation. Yet, that being said, there is a limit implicit in the finitude of human life that
cannot, with a sweep of the hand, be interpreted away."). It is at this point that I disagree with
the strong version of Fish's critique of Dworkin, see Fish, supra note 113. Consider the midrash
about Abraham and the idols and hypothesize a serial author who picks up the story immediately
after the confrontation between Terach and his son over the broken idols. Is this author exactly
as free as the first? The first could have written any kind of story, even any kind of story of faith.
But the second must make something of Abraham's iconoclasm; it is too powerful an image not
to be accounted for. It may yet mean many things; but there are some things it cannot mean.
Thus, for example, it is difficult to see how a serial author could turn Abraham's act into an
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divide from the persuasive to the transformative. At this point, narrative is used to play a crucial role in reconstructing the outcomes of
legal and social debate.
In my recent TranscendentalNonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and
the Cognitive Stakes for Law, I argue that rights must be grounded in
the experiences of the beneficiaries if they are to be meaningful.' 7'
How is this possible when "experience" is different for different people

and, by definition, the lawmakers have not shared the experience of
the disempowered? Again, the answer lies in the cognitive role of ex-

perience and imagination. The transformative potential of narrative
inheres in the cognitive power of concrete imagery and the empathetic

potential of the imagination.
One reason for the transformative potential of narrative is its capacity to present forceful images and relatively concrete experiences in

a comprehensible manner. There is a "basic level" of cognitive interaction with the environment that conforms to human perceptual abilities relative to observable attributes, motor movements, and similarity

in shape.172 Thus, to take the simplest example, the neurophysiological process of color perception is such that the names of some hues are
more easily learned and remembered than others. 73 The grounding of
all human cognition in experience means that there is a greater cognitive "clout" to images from lived experience as compared to propositional formulations that attempt to "literalize" their meaning. The

dramatic image of Abraham smashing the idols, for example, has a
affirmation of the familial status quo. The difficulty inheres not in anything intrinsic to the story,
but rather in the grounded manner in which we make meaning. This disagreement, however,
does not vitiate the power of Fish's critique of Dworkin. For the trajectory and meaning of the
story is still open to reconstruction by the serial author. Thus, while there are constraints on
what the act might mean, there is no constraint on the next installment that determines whether
the story will become one of reconciliation or remain one of rebellion.
171. TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1224-34.
172. The concept of a "basic level" derives from the experimental work of Eleanor Rosch in
the field of categorization. Rosch, Principlesof Categorization,in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 27 (E. Rosch & B. Lloyd eds. 1978). Rosch posits that humans form "categories ... to
maximize the information-rich cluster of attributes in the environment," and that categorization
at this level shows the greatest degree ofstimulus commonality within the category and of stimulus discontinuity between related categories. Id. at 37.
173. There is a substantial body of recent empirical work that documents the cross-cultural
nature of prototype effects in the perception of the color spectrum regardless of language and
cultural differences. TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1137-40. Eleanor Rosch found
that when the children between three and four years old were asked to "show a color to the
experimenter," "focal" colors were more frequently selected than were "nonfocal" colors; "focal" colors were also more accurately matched and more frequently chosen to represent the color
name. Rosch & Heider, "Focal" Color Areas and the Development of Color Names, 4 DEV.
PSYCHOLOGY 447 (1971); see also Rosch & Heider, Universalsin Color Naming and Memory, 93
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYC. 10, 19 (1972); Rosch, Heider & Olivier, The Structure of the Color
Space in Naming and Memory for Two Languages, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 337 (1972);
Rosch, Natural Categories,4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 328, 331 (1973).
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communicative power that is unmatched by the "equivalent" propositional statement "Abraham rejected as empty his father's religious
practices and authority."' 74
Transformative argument is possible because the advocate can use
narrative to invite the audience into the world of the rights-holder (or
rights-seeker). That world will be constructed in part of models and
metaphors already shared with the audience.' 7 5 But within this constructed story-world, there will be depicted concrete experiences that
are unfamiliar or unknown to the audience. Through the process of
projection that makes possible narrative understanding, the audience
will imagine itself confronted by these experiences; it will be challenged to make sense of them through its own past experiences in order to understand the story-events as a coherent story-experience of its
own. 176 The concrete power of the imagery with which the reader can
be confronted - Abraham smashing the idols, the boy drawing the
targets around the arrows - can be used directly to engage the audience in the cognitive process by which it regularly makes meaning in
its day-to-day world. Because the cognitive process is basically imaginative, the process of making sense of the projected experience of the
story will be mimetic of the process by which humans always make
meaning. The audience "lives" the story-experience, and is brought
personally to engage in the process of constructing meaning out of
another's experience.1 77 Through this process, the audience can
achieve a measure of understanding and empathy. Transformative
communication is possible, but there are no guarantees.
Let me concretize this with a specific example. Not long ago, I
watched a rerun of one of my favorite episodes of the situation-comedy
"Taxi." Louie (Danny DeVito), who is the dispatcher, is caught peeping at Elaine (Marilu Henner), one of the cab drivers, while she is
174. Similarly, in discussing the meaning of the blindfold worn by Justicia, Cover observes
that "[t]he richness of the concreteness of our icon lies in its incapacity to be reduced 'merely' to
an idea like impartiality." R. COVER, 0. Fiss & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE 1231 (1988).
175. Because we are essentially similar subjects interacting with our environments in terms of
the same processes, there is quite a lot of meaning that is shared. We also share large amounts of

mediated, social experience such as the completely value-laden, socially constructed experiences
that make up the meaning of the ICM of mother. See supra note 29. We use these models,
metaphors, image-schemata, and other basic experiences that are shared to understand other
things that are not. In this way, nonshared meaning is commensurable and thus potentially
communicable even to others who have not had the same experiences.
176. Cf Minow, supra note 29, at 89-90 ("I petition all judges to open up to the chance that
someone may move them - the experience will not tell them what to do, but it may give them a
way outside of the routinized categories to forge new approaches to the problem at hand.")
(footnote omitted).
177. See id. at 80 ("Putting ourselves in the place of those who look different can push us to

challenge our ignorance and fears and investigate our usual categories for making sense of the
world.").
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dressing in the ladies' room. Elaine threatens a discrimination suit for
sexual harassment and succeeds in getting Louie fired. Louie then
shows up at Elaine's apartment to beg her forgiveness and engage her
help in getting his job back.
Elaine tells him that she will only forgive him and help get his job
back if he comes to understand why what he did is wrong, and that he
can only do that if he understands how he made her feel. Anyone who
knows the show understands that this is especially difficult because,
aside from the ordinary gulf between the experiences and perceptions
of men and women, the Louie character is the world's least empathetic, most crude and cynical human. In fact, Elaine is fairly confident that she will not have to make good on her offer; "There is no
way that you can understand."
Louie quickly comes up with the obvious: "I know, I know, because I made you feel like an object." 178 (In an aside, he says: "Boy,
am I glad I watched that Donahue. Broads love that stuff.") After a
few more tries, Elaine begins to take pity at Louie's desperation and
appeals to his experience: "Hasn't something ever happened to you
where everybody was looking at you and that made you feel terrible?"
Louie, of course, is unusually short. He describes what it is like, once
a year, to go to the boys' section of the department store to buy a new
suit. He tells the story, describing the mortification he feels as the
mothers shush their sons and then turn away when he looks in their
direction. "Is that how I made you feel?"
This story illustrates the role that experience and projection play in
communication and intersubjective meaning. Neither Louie nor any
other man can understand directly the degradation a woman feels
when she is spied on. If someone had peeked in on Louie when he was
dressing, the "events" would have been the same in one sense but the
"experience" would have been entirely different. Nevertheless, Louie
is able to understand Elaine's feelings by means of his own experience.
Even though both of their feelings are mediated differently - hers by
her previous experience as a woman, his by the experience of his stature - communication and shared meaning are nevertheless attainable. This meaning will not be determinate - that is, Louie's
179
understanding of what Elaine felt will not be isomorphic with hers.
Nevertheless, the imaginative processes of cognition enable Louie to
178. Taxi: Louie Goes Too Far (ABC television broadcast, December 17, 1981).
This formulation is based on an object metaphor and is intelligible precisely because we know
what an object is with very little conscious mediation and because we are capable of metaphoric
projection - that is, understanding Louie's treatment of Elaine by means of one's treatment of a
literal object for its instrumental value only.
179. To underline the imperfection of this process of communication, the episode ends with a
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achieve a degree of empathy and to understand Elaine's experience by
means of his own. A moment of "intersubjective zap" has been
80
achieved.
This is what I mean when I suggest in my Transcendental Nonsense article that rights can be made meaningful if grounded in the
experience of people.' 8 ' First, I mean that it is critically important for
women and blacks and other minorities to tell these stories.' 8 2 Second, I mean that we need to make the effort to use the tools of comprehension and communication to understand what that experience is
like: what it feels like to be discriminated against; what it feels like to
be taken for granted, reduced to an object, and abused. This kind of
empathetic understanding is difficult to achieve; it can be done only
when we understand that it is human experience we are trying to comprehend, and not some objective description of "events" in the world.
Third, I am arguing that we can - with work - accomplish that
understanding. I think so because I understand meaning as arising
from basic interactions with a shared environment and a shared (but
not identical) social reality. Moreover, I understand meaning as an
imaginative process. For most of us who share substantially the same
culture, the same ICMs mediate our experience and are available for
communication. Beyond that, narratives that express particular, individual experiences can be communicated by means of appeals to commonalities, by metaphor, and by storytelling - specific, imaginative
constructions that are expressed in the concrete realities of our everyday experiences.
To paraphrase Nelson Goodman: In narrative, experience moont 83
lights as intersubjective meaning.

sitcom twist: while Louie and Elaine embrace to celebrate their moment of connection, Louie
reaches down and squeezes Elaine's buttocks.
180. The term "intersubjective zap" is Duncan Kennedy's. Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over
Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1984).
181. TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 10, at 1228-34. It should be clear from even a
cursory reading of my TranscendentalNonsense that I advocate no "aestheticized" self-transformation through imagination and narrative. Rather, as I say there: "To make meaning, one must
do meaning." Id. at 1231. With Cover, I believe that meaning is made through committed
action - "in the medium of blood." Id. (quoting Cover, supra note 10, at 47-48).
182. West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 65 (1988).
183. Goodman, Metaphor as Moonlighting, in ON METAPHOR, supra note 15, at 180.

